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INTRODUCTION

This article considers the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing as a common law wrongful dismissal theory.' This
covenant provided the framework for the earliest steps in modifying the employment-at-will rule as a substantive limitation on
employee recovery for wrongful dismissal. The implied covenant
theory is of major significance in wrongful dismissal law2 because
it represents a way to place employment tenure beyond the employer's control and because it widens the spectrum of employer
conduct that may be considered to constitute a breach.3
The California Supreme Court's decision in the case of Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp.4 has revived interest in the implied covenant theory. Foley is most often regarded as a setback to the
plaintiff bar because it rejected tort damages for breaches of the
implied covenant of good faith. But Foley could also have

I Some parts of this article are draw from the author's treatise entitled Employee
Dismissal Law and Practice, which contains an in depth study in the area of wrongful
dismissal law.
2 See, e.g., Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d
1025 (1985) (covenant does not depend on party intent); Murphy v. American
Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (rejecting implied covenant as inconsistent with parties' intent); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 19-20 (3d. ed. 1987) ("[a] contract

implied in law is not a contract at all but an obligation imposed by law to do justice
even though it is clear that no promise was ever made or intended"). See generally C.
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 74-91 (1981) (discussing the doctrine of good faith as

a method in revising contractual arrangements).
3 Compare Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 572-73, 335
N.W.2d 834, 840-41 (1983) (no breach of implied covenant unless clear public policy violated by discharge) with Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. 370, 385, 710 P.2d 1025, 1039
(covenant does not require good cause for termination as some California cases do,
but not articulating definitive limits); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont.
178, 184, 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1982) (if employer fails to follow handbook procedures that were not contractually binding, breach of implied covenant results).
4 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
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adopted objective restrictions on the implied covenant but failed
to do so. Foley may therefore be a boon to the plaintiff bar because it legitimatizes the basic theory which, even under contract
measures of damages, potentially permits hundreds of thousands
of dollars to be awarded in any individual case. This article takes
a fresh look at the implied covenant doctrine, noting where appropriate how the Foley opinion impacts on case analysis and
makes projections for the future.
This article initially reviews two other major theories for
wrongful dismissal: the implied-in-fact contract and the public
policy tort. In addition, this article introduces the implied covenant as the third exception to the employment-at-will rule. Part
II reviews use of the implied covenant more thoroughly, from its
reception into contract law to its application in the employment
termination context. Part III considers the future of the implied
covenant, justifying externally imposed limitations on contract
rights in general, considering the role of the covenant in a relational view of contracts, and then considering three possible interpretations of the covenant as a limitation on employment
terminations: (1) as a source of protection for legitimate employee expectations; (2) as a source of an administrative law type
deferential review of employer decisions, and; (3) as a source of
obligation to dismiss only for good cause. Part IV explores a just
cause interpretation of the covenant in greater detail, considering practical application issues like the allocation of decisionmaking responsibility in a dismissal controversy among employer, judge, and jury. Part V considers jury instructions for a
just cause interpretation and other more deferential interpretations. Part V then observes that, based on a comparison of jury
instructions, there may not be a substantial difference between a
just cause interpretation and a more deferential interpretation.
Part VI considers damages theories, explaining that, even under
Foley, large front pay awards are conceptually available.
This article concludes in Part VII that, in the absence of a
comprehensive statutory reform, the implied covenant will most
likely be used to expand the substantive rights afforded at-will
employees. This article does not consider the impact of increased transaction costs on employment practices or employment opportunities, except briefly in section III, enumerating the
disadvantages of a good cause limitation. Any externally imposed legal standard that increases the opportunities for litigation over employment decisions increases the average
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transaction cost of each potentially affected decision. Because resources must be made available to cover these transaction costs,
they are not available for employee compensation or forjob creation investment.
A.

Other Wrongful Dismissal Theories

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is one of
three exceptions to the employment-at-will rule,5 which together
constitute the universe of common law wrongful dismissal theories. This section reviews the other two exceptions, which are
currently more influential.
1.

Implied-in-Fact Contract

Courts in virtually every state recognize an implied-in-fact
contract theory of wrongful dismissal.6 The implied-in-fact contract theory requires a plaintiff to plead and to prove the following: (1) the employer made a promise of employment security;7
(2) the employee gave consideration for the promise, in the form
of detrimental reliance by continuing employment or otherwise;'
(3) the employer breached the promise by dismissing the employee, and; (4) the employee suffered damages. 9 Under this theory the employment-at-will presumption can be overcome by
proof of an informal contract to dismiss only for certain reasons
or only through certain procedures.
The promise element can be established by handbook provisions, personnel policies published for employees, or oral assurances by persons authorized to speak for the employer.'0 There
is growing acceptance of the proposition that consideration for
an informal employer promise can be found in the employee's
continuing to work and performing normal duties after knowing
of the employer's promise. The rationale is that the continued
performance of service is a detriment suffered by the employee
5 The employment-at-will rule holds that an employer can dismiss an at-will
employee at any time for any reason or for no reason. H. PERRiTr, EMPLOYEE DisMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.1, at 1 n.l (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter
H. PERRr', EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL].
6 See id. § 1.12, at 23-30 (state by state summary).
7 This can be thought of as an offer.
8 This can be thought of as acceptance.
9 H. PERRir, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, § 1.2, at 2.
10 But cf. Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 336 Pa. Super. 90, 545 A.2d 334 (1988)
(Pennsylvania law does not bar handbook promises as a matter of law, but courts
often find oral and handbook statements too general to enforce).
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which was bargained for by the employer." Even when the "bargained-for" aspect cannot be met, the employer's promise can be
enforced under the promissory estoppel doctrine, contained in
section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, if the employee
acted in reasonable reliance on the promise and such conduct
should reasonably have been expected by the employer. 2,
Of course, employers are free to avoid promises of employment tenure and may publish disclaimers to foreclose reliance on
informal promises. 1 3 The implied-in-fact contract theory thus is
largely under the control of the employer.
2.

Public Policy Tort

Courts in all but six states' 4 recognize a private right of action for employee dismissals that jeopardize a specific public policy interest of the state. This category of tort liability is called the
public policy tort. Intentional tort principles permit a plaintiff to
recover only by showing that a legally protected right of the
plaintiff was harmed by an act of the defendant and that the defendant lacked justification for his act.' 5 Until the public policy
tort theory was accepted by the courts, dismissed employees
could recover in tort only if they could show that their dismissals
were accompanied by conduct or a state of mind sufficient to satisfy traditional tort categories such as intentional interference
with contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation, defamation, or invasion of
privacy. None of these traditional theories permitted the em-

I" In Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified,
101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985), the NewJersey Supreme Court determined that
provisions included in a policy manual are supported by consideration. Id. at 302,
491 A.2d at 1267. Further, the court concluded that a promise to dismiss only for
cause was inherent in the nature of the handbook, which apparently was intended
to discourage unionization. Id. at 307, 491 A.2d at 1269-70. The court held that
reliance by employees in general should be presumed and need not be shown in
individual cases. Id. See also H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5,
§§ 4.12-4.18, at 197-213 (role of consideration as validation device).
12 See H. PERRrI-r, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, § 4.17, at 210-13.
13 See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text for a brief discussion on waivers
and disclaimers.
14 Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Rhode Island continue to honor the employment-at-will doctrine. These states have, however, expressed a willingness to recognize some exceptions. It is thus unclear whether
these states would recognize a private cause of action for wrongful dismissal. H.
PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, § 1.12, at 29.
15 The analytical framework is provided in section 870 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts (1979), discussed more extensively in H. PERRiTr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL,
supra note 5, §§ 5.5-5.7, at 250-54.
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ployee to recover for the dismissal itself. The newer public pol16
icy tort theory, a specific application of the prima facie tort,
permits a dismissed employee to recover for the dismissal itself,' 7
when the dismissal violates a clear public policy of the state.
Public policy tort cases require courts to balance employee,
employer, and societal interests under a formula presented in
section 870 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. To win a public
policy tort case for wrongful dismissal, the employee must show:
(1) the existence of a clear public policy, manifested in a state or
federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in
the common law; (2) that dismissing employees under circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff's dismissal would jeopardize the public policy; (3) that the plaintiff's dismissal was
motivated by conduct related to the public policy, and; (4) that
the employer lacked any overriding legitimate business justification for the dismissal.' 8

Another way to understand the elements of the public policy
tort are to view steps one and two as embodying an inquiry into
whether the employee conduct was protected, in the sense that
section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act or whistleblower
statutes protect only certain conduct.' 9 Under this approach to
the public policy tort, only employee conduct necessary to promote the public policy is protected by the public policy tort concept. Implicit in deciding whether public policy requires the
protection of certain conduct are two subordinate inquiries: identifying that public policy and deciding how it would be jeopardized if the conduct in controversy were discouraged by the threat
of dismissal. Separating the clarity and jeopardy elements permits more principled decision making as to what conduct is protected than an undifferentiated protected conduct approach. In
any event, a balancing process is required.
The balancing process can be symbolized by the scales of
16 The prima facie tort allows recovery if the employer dismissed the employee
with malice and without justification. See H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra

note 5, § 5.21, at 288-90. "Malice" is a legal term of art meaning little more than
the mental state motivating harmful conduct in the absence ofjustification.
17 Id. §§ 5.5, 5.21, at 250, 288-90.
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979).
'9 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1973). See aLso Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,

437 U.S. 556, 565-66
(1978) (distribution of political leaflets protected); Squire Dist. Co. v. Teamsters
Local 7, 801 F.2d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1986) (reporting embezzlement to sheriff protected when motivated by job security concerns); Love v. RE/MAX of America,
Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984) (good faith, protest of discrimination

against women protected under Equal Pay Act and Fair Labor Standards Act).
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justice. On the employee's side of these scales is an obvious economic interest in employment. On the employer's side is an obvious economic interest in running the business as the employer
sees fit. If the employee asserts no other interest, society places
an additional interest on the employer's side of the scales-the
employment-at-will rule, representing society's interest in market
forces as the best way to promote efficient enterprise. This is
sufficient to tip the scales in favor of the employer and against the
employee. If, however, the employee can add a societal interest
to his or her side of the scales, the employee may win, depending
on the weightiness of the interest. Of course, the employer may
assert additional justification for the dismissal on the employer's
side, which may tilt the scales back in the employer's favor. Liability is imposed on the employer whenever the interests of the
terminated employee and the public outweigh the interests of the
employer.
Reasonably clear alternative rules have emerged for the public policy tort concept. The majority rule, more favorable to employees, involves a flexible interest balancing approach similar to
that outlined in the preceding paragraph. 20 The narrower approach, less favorable to employees, denies recovery unless the
employee can show that he was dismissed for exercising an explicit statutory right,2 or for refusing to violate an explicit statutory prohibition.22
B.

Role of Implied Covenant

The implied covenant is a third common law doctrine enabling an employee to recover for breach of contract 23 when the
employer has violated a "covenant of good faith and fair deal20 See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 721
F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying Pennsylvania public policy tort concept to find
triable case for employee fired for refusing to testify before legislative committee
according to employer direction based on the public policy of first amendment to
the United States Constitution).
21 Buethe v. Britt Airlines, Inc., 787 F.2d 1194, 1197 (7th Cir. 1986); Gryzb v.
Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
22 Adler v. American Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1307 (4th Cir. 1987);
Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 141, 396 N.W.2d 167, 170 (1986).
See generally H. PERRrr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, § 5.19A (1990 Supp. 1)
(discussing more limited theory).
23 Some courts treat breach of the implied covenant as a tort, but it properly is
conceived of as a breach of contract theory, based on a contract term supplied by
law. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1988) (covenant is essentially a contract theory).
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ing," implied in all contracts as a matter of law.2 4 Conceptually,
the covenant requires that contract rights be exercised in a manner that does not violate the covenant. Thus, even though an
employer has the right to terminate an at-will contract for any
reason, good or bad, or for no reason at all, the employer also
has a duty not to exercise this right in bad faith or unfairly.
Under the broadest view of the doctrine, a dismissed employee need only show: (1) existence of an employment relationship; (2) termination of the employment, and; (3) some aspect of
the termination that was unfair or in bad faith. Upon such a
showing, a jury is entitled to decide, with only the most general
instructions, 25 whether the termination was fair and in good faith.
Under the implied covenant, external standards of fairness are
used to scrutinize an employer's decision to dismiss an employee
and, logically, other employer decisions.
The implied covenant doctrine enjoyed brief popularity and
was used by the courts that were the first to relax the employment-at-will rule. But as the more traditional and circumscribed
implied-in-fact contract and public policy tort doctrines were developed, the importance of the implied covenant doctrine declined. Now, California, Massachusetts, and Montana are the
only states that rely heavily on the implied covenant as the primary wrongful dismissal doctrine. Further, California and Massachusetts impose important limitations on its use. Quite
recently, the California Supreme Court, in Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp. ,26 held that tort damages are not recoverable in implied
covenant cases. The Montana courts have been aggressive in using the implied covenant doctrine to impose something close to a
just cause requirement.2 7 In Montana, an employer is burdened
to show a "fair and honest reason" for a dismissal to escape liability under the covenant.28
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a speSee H. PERRrrr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, § 4.11 at 191-97.
See id. § 7.28, at 436-39 (example of implied covenant jury instructions). But
see infra notes 269-91 and accompanying text (regarding how jury instructions can
be made more specific).
26 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
27 See, e.g., Broomfield v. Lundell, 139 Ariz. 349, 767 P.2d 697 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988) (interposition of leasing company between nurse and physician/former employer did not interrupt employment relationship between nurse and physician for
purposes of implied covenant theory).
28 See Stark v. Circle K. Corp., 230 Mont. 468, 751 P.2d 162 (1988) (affirming
$270,000 jury verdict for employee who refused to sign probationary notice, the
accuracy of which he contested).
24
25
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cial implied-in-law promise. It is a substitute for an express or
implied-in-fact promise by the employer. 29 The implied promise
imposes a legally enforceable obligation not to exercise the
otherwise unlimited power of termination in bad faith or for reasons offending public policy. This implied covenant concept resembles a tort theory more than a contract theory because it tests
the defendant's compliance with a duty imposed through public
policy rather than through a voluntary promise. This may explain some of the confusion in early wrongful dismissal cases between contract and tort. °
The implied covenant is the strongest manifestation of the
relational contract theory in employment law. Contract doctrine
applied to all kinds of transactions is becoming more relational in
character. 3 ' Employment contracts are not exempt from this
trend, and the implied covenant idea is certain to play an increasing role in deciding employment contract disputes.
Application of the implied covenant is not always detrimental to employer interests. The implied covenant doctrine also imposes the burden of proof on an employee-plaintiff to show bad
faith or ulterior motivation. This allocation of the burden of
proof is significantly more favorable to employers than that contained in the most recently enacted federal legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act, which burdens an employer to prove
the infeasibility of accommodating employee handicaps.3 2
The next part of this article explores the covenant in greater
depth, considering its genesis in contract doctrine generally, as
well as considering specific wrongful dismissal cases.
II.

ORIGINS OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT DOCTRINE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO EMPLOYMENT

This part reviews use of the implied covenant from its recep29 See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 381, 710 P.2d
1025, 1036 (1985) (implied-in-law term is imposed where contract silent and it
does not depend on parties' intent).
30 See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 574, 335 N.W.2d 834,
841 (1983); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 174-75, 610 P.2d
1330, 1334-35, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843-44 (1980) (both cases discuss relationship
between tort and contract based recovery).
31 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts cites the Uniform Commercial Code as an

example of the kind of relational contract doctrine which should be applied to contracts in general.
32 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 (S993), 104 Stat.

327 (1990).
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tion into contract law to its application in the employment termination context.
A.

Role of Good Faith in Contract Law

Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement. 3 3 The
commentary to section 205 states:
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith
in performance even though the actor believes his conduct to
be justified. But the obligation goes further: bad faith may be
overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require
more than honesty. A complete catalogue of types of bad faith
is impossible, but the following types are among those which
have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the
spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful
rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of power to specify
terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the
other party's performance.3 4
Earlier, Professor Corbin referred to a standard of fairness and
good faith in explaining how courts "prevent the disappointment of
expectations that the transaction aroused in one party, as the other
had reason to know." ' 5 To serve this goal, "courts find and enforce
promises that were not put into words .... "6 There was, however,
no covenant of good faith provision in the Restatement (First) of
Contracts.3 7
Before its emergence in the employment-at-will context, a good
faith standard of contract performance or termination attracted
commentary and judicial attention primarily in connection with its
inclusion in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Professor
Farnsworth reviewed the history of two UCC good faith obligations:
good faith purchase and good faith performance.3 8 The former
originated in English merchant law as a way of importing commer33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a (1981). The comment to section 205 cites Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 344
N.E.2d 1251 (1977) as an example of an application of the section. See infra notes
72-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fortune.
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment d (1981).
35 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 541, at 514 (1952).
36

Id.

37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a (1981).
38 Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under

form Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L.

REV.

666, 668 (1963).

the Uni-
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cial morality into the law. 9 The latter was neglected until its incorporation into the UCC.4 ° Farnsworth opined that good faith
performance should be judged by "an objective standard based on
the decency, fairness or reasonableness of the community, commercial or otherwise, of which one is a member."'"
Professor Summers considered good faith as a standard of contract performance in the context of the growing interest "in devising
legal standards of contractual morality," stimulated in his view by
the UCC's express obligation of good faith.4 2 He also noted that
good faith is applied as a standard in a wide variety of contractual
relationships,43 and reviewed the following types of conduct that
have been limited by the good faith standard in the context of contract performance:4 4 (1) evading the spirit of the deal; 45 (2) lack of
diligence and slacking off;4 6 (3) willfully rendering only "substantial" performance;4 7 (4) abuse of a power to specify contract
terms; 48 (5) abuse of a power to determine compliance; 49 (6) interfering with or failing to cooperate in the other party's performance; 50 (7) conjuring up a dispute;5 (8) adopting overreaching or
"weaseling" interpretations and constructions of contract language;5 2 (9) taking advantage of another to get a favorable readjustment or settlement of a dispute;5 (10) abuse of a right to adequate
assurances of future performance; 54 (11) wrongful refusal to accept
56
the other's performance;5 5 (12) willful failure to mitigate damages,
Id. at 670.
Id. at 670-71.
41 Id. See also Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-FranchiseCancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465 (suggesting unconscionability is a more workable standard than good faith; terminations should be evaluated in terms of rationality of
condition for termination and impact on franchisee).
42 Summers, "Good Faith" in General ContractLaw and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
43 Id. at 197.
44 Id. Professor Summers also commented on use of the good faith standard in
contract formation. See id. at 220-32.
45 Id. at 234-35.
46 Id. at 235-37.
47 Id. at 237-38.
48 Id. at 239-40.
49 Id. at 240-41.
50 Id. at 241-43.
51 Id. at 243-44.
52 Id. at 244-46.
53 Id. at 246-48.
54 Id. at 248-49.
55 Id. at 249-50.
56 Id. at 250-51.
39

40
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and; (13) abuse of a power to terminate."
Professor Summers argued that good faith is best understood
as an "excluder"-a phrase which excludes heterogeneous forms of
bad faith,58 specifically including "arbitrarily and capriciously exercising a power to terminate a contract." 5 9 Professor Summers did
not elaborate on the standards for termination under the covenant,
but simply cited Professor Gellhorn. 6 °
B.

History of Application to Employment Contracts

Although section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
and its commentary do not address employment contracts or the
exercise of the power to terminate an employment contract the
section's concept can be used to imply an employer obligation
not to discharge employees wrongfully. The 1959 California
case of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters6 1 frequently is cited as the seminal case in the modem wrongful dismissal revolution.6" In Petermann, the plaintiff was employed by a
union as a business agent. He claimed that he was dismissed for
refusing to commit perjury before a committee of the state legislature.6" The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a
judgment on the pleadings. 64
The court of appeals noted that the plaintiff's breach of contract cause of action was predicated on an employment contract
that did not contain any fixed period of duration. It quoted the
usual rule: "Generally, such a relationship is terminable at the
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.

at 251-52 (citing Gellhorn, supra note 41, at 495-505).
at 196.
at 203 (citing J.R. Watkins Co. v. Rich, 254 Mich. 82, 85, 235 N.W. 845,
846 (1931)). In Watkins, the court concluded that the arbitrary termination of a
salesman released sureties from contract liability. The court stated: "A provision in
a contract for termination at the option of a party is valid. But where the relationship is commercial and does not involve fancy, taste, sensibility, judgment, or other
personal features, the option may be exercised only in good faith." Watkins, 254
Mich. at 85, 235 N.W. at 846.
60 Id. at 252 (citing Gellhorn, supra note 41, at 495-505).
61 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
62 A Westlaw search in December, 1989 showed nearly 200 citations to
Petermann. When Petermann was decided, it was well established that the presumption of an indefinite employment contract, terminable at-will, can be overcome by
evidence of the parties' intent to restrict the power of termination. H. PERRITr,
EMPLOYEE DisMiSSAL, supra note 5, § § 1.1-1.17, at 1-39 (discussing the presumption
of employment-at-will). See also id. §§ 4.6-4.20, at 180-221; 7.17-7.21, at 412-27
(discussing means of rebutting the presumption of an at-will employment through
factual evidence).
63 Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
64 Id.
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will of either party for any reason whatsoever. "65 However, the
court noted that "the right to discharge an employee under such
contract may be limited by statute or by considerations of public
policy." ' 66 The court acknowledged that the public policy concept is vague, but characterized it as "that principle of law which
holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to
be injurious to the public or against the public good. ' 67 The
court easily concluded that allowing an employer to dismiss an
employee for refusing to commit perjury offends public policy. 68
Thus, in the absence of any factual evidence of an actual promise
of employment security, the court implied a promise not to dismiss for policy-offensive reasons.
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 6 9 was another early case applying
the covenant. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in a suit for breach of
an employment contract which was for an indefinite period of
time. The court found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the plaintiff's dismissal was motivated by her refusal to
"go out with" her foreman.70 After a brief discussion of the need
to modify the employment-at-will rule, the court held "that a termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will
which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation
is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public
'T
good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract.' 7
Again, the promise of employment tenure was implied-in-law.
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,72 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that a trial court committed no error in submitting the issue of bad faith termination of an employment-at-will contract to the jury. The plaintiff was employed
under a written salesman's contract which was terminable at-will,
Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27-28. The employer argued that the employee was
not dismissed because of the policy-offensive ground of refusal to commit perjury.
Whether it relied in good faith on a legitimate reason for the dismissal was a question of fact.
69 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
70 Id. at 133-34, 316 A.2d at 552.
71 Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551 (citations omitted). In Howard v. Door Woolen
Co., 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980), the court limited Monge to
reasons for discharge that clearly offend public policy, thus virtually merging the
doctrine with the public policy tort.
72 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). Fortune is referred to in the Reporter's
notes to section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
65
66
67
68
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without cause, by either party on written notice. The defendant
apparently admitted the existence of a legally enforceable contract. The court held that the plaintiff, in spite of the literal
wording of the contract, was entitled to a jury determination on
his employer's motives in terminating him.73 The premise for
the employer's obligation not to discharge in bad faith was a legally implied covenant. In support of its conclusion, the court
cited statutory provisions which required good faith in respect to
contracts under the UCC, under motor vehicle franchise contracts, and according to a number of cases assuming or implying
a requirement of good faith in contract performance.74 The Massachusetts court also cited Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 75 and section

231 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.76
The California Court of Appeal observed, in Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,7 that employment contracts, like all contracts,
include an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Having concluded generally that the plaintiff's contract included a
covenant of good faith, the court decided that an important factor in construing the covenant was the plaintiff's eighteen years
of service: "Termination of employment without legal cause after
such a period of time offends
the implied-in-law covenant of
78
good faith and fair dealing."

These early implied covenant cases suggested no real limits
to the scope of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal73 Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1255-56. The court noted:

Fortune argues that, in spite of the literal wording of the contract, he
is entitled to a jury determination on NCR's motives in terminating
his services under the contract and in finally discharging him. We
agree. We hold that NCR's written contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination not made in
good faith constitutes a breach of the contract.
Id.
74 Id. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256 (citing U.C.C. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement")); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93B, § 4(3)(c) (1978) (requiring good faith in motor
vehicle franchise termination).
75 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). This section was
identified as section 231 in the tentative draft cited by the Fortune court. The court
declined to speculate whether the good faith requirement is implicit in every employment-at-will contract. Fortune, 373 Mass. at 104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
77 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980).
78 Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. Cleary has subsequently been construed to
imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing only when (1) longevity of employment is present, or (2) the employer has promulgated a policy for adjudicating employee disputes. See Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467,
478, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (1984) (affirming demurrer).
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ing. Juries apparently were to be allowed to decide for themselves what constituted good faith and to decide if the employer's
actions met the standard thus derived by them. 79 Under this approach, the implied covenant doctrine would give employees
very broad protection.
C. Resistance to Covenant
Courts willing to relax the employment-at-will rule began to
raise doubts about the implied covenant theory in the early
1980's. The New York Court of Appeals in Murphy v. American
Home Products Corp. ,80 opposed implying a promise in a breach of
contract action that is inconsistent with the manifest intent of the
parties. The court reasoned that "it would be incongruous to say
that an inference may be drawn that the employer impliedly
agreed to a provision which would be destructive of his right of
termination."'" The court declined to imply such a covenant as a
matter of law for the same reasons it declined to recognize a public policy tort theory for wrongful dismissal-its belief that the
legislature was the appropriate branch of government to weigh
the policy factors involved.82
Increasingly, state supreme courts confronted with the question have rejected the covenant, or at least have declined to embrace it.83 Some courts have questioned the need for the
79 See infra notes 269-291 and accompanying text for a discussion of jury
instructions.
80 58 N.Y.2d 293, 304, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1983) (accepting implied-in-fact contract theory, but rejecting implied covenant).
81 Id. at 304-05, 448 N.E.2d at 91, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
82 Id. at 301, 448 N.E.2d at 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
83 See, e.g., Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co., 495 So.2d 1381 (Ala. 1986) (declining to extend covenant of good faith recognized in insurance cases to employment
contracts); Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 738 P.2d 841 (1987) (adopting
implied-in-fact contract theory but rejecting implied covenant theory); Greenlee v.
Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 241 Kan. 802, 740 P.2d 606 (1987) (no covenant of good
faith applicable to employment-at-will); Sadler v. Basic Elect. Power Coop., 409
N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1987) (no covenant of good faith when employment contract contains no express term specifying duration; remanding for trial of fact issues on implied contract claim based on handbook); Hillesland v. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n, 407
N.W.2d 206 (N.D. 1987) (rejecting implied covenant of good faith; finding
Wadeson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1984), not inconsistent); Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989) (rejecting implied covenant as ill defined; adopting public policy tort theory for employees dismissed for
refusing to act in violation of clear public policy or for performing an act consistent
with clear and compelling public policy); Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla.
1987) (facts do not require decision on whether to accept "nationally recognized"
public policy tort theory; implied covenant theory rejected; facts do not support
implied contract theory) (citing H. PERRrrr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5,
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covenant theory now that more traditional theories such as implied-in-fact contract and public policy tort are recognized
widely.84 For example, in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.,85 the
Supreme Court of Washington, while adopting the implied-infact contract theory and the public policy tort theory, refused to
adopt the implied covenant theory because its bad faith concept
is "amorphous," and because it might be internally inconsistent
with actual conduct or promises.
Other courts have used the covenant grudgingly. The Wis86
consin Supreme Court, in Brockmeyer v. hn & Bradstreet,
although recognizing the implied covenant doctrine, limited it
greatly. The Brochmeyer court stressed that implied covenant recovery should be limited to dismissals "contrary to a fundamen' 7
tal and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law. "
In effect, it used the implied covenant theory to limit damages
available under the public policy tort theory.8 8 In Bertrand v.
§§ 4.12-4.14, at 197-205); Melnick v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 726,
749 P.2d 1105 (1988) (declining to adopt covenant for employment terminable atwill; reviewing limitations imposed by other states); Blote v. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n of Rapid City, 422 N.W.2d 834 (S.D. 1988) (personnel manual provisions
relating to vacation policy lacked specificity to override bank bylaws permitting dismissal at-will; dissenting opinion criticizes failure to permit recovery on implied
covenant theory); Breen v. Dakota Gear &Joint Co., 433 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 1988)
(affirming summary judgment for employer on case showing nothing more than ten
years employment with no criticism-fails to meet requirements for implied-in-fact
contract; refusing to adopt implied covenant in addition to previously adopted public policy tort and implied-in-fact contract).
84 See, e.g., Hunt v. IBM Mid-Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d
853 (Minn. 1986) (majority ofjurisdictions have rejected covenant for sound policy
reasons, suggesting that it might be available if facts imply contract for permanent
employment); Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987) (refusal to accept
implied covenant theory because of its amorphous character); Hillesland v. Fed.
Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206 (N.D. 1987) (rejecting implied covenant theory
and expressly approving reasoning of Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.
2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)).
Although accepting the implied-in-fact contract theory, the Kansas Supreme
Court rejected the covenant as overly broad. Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan.
501, 738 P.2d 841 (1987). See also Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989)
(rejecting implied covenant theory as ill defined; while adopting public policy tort
theory); Melnick v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 726, 749 P.2d 1105
(1988) (rejecting implied covenant as theory applicable to employment terminable
at-will-at least where no "improper motivation" shown); Breen v. Dakota Gear &
Joint Co., 433 N.W.2d 221, 224 (S.D. 1988) (rejecting implied covenant theory, and
distinguishing it from public policy tort and implied-in-fact contract theory).
85 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
86 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
87 Id. at 573, 335 N.W.2d at 840.
88 See id. See also Melnick v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 106 N.M. 726, 749
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Quincy Market Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. ,89 the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that, under Massachusetts law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is not appropriate where collectively bargained arbitration exists
as a remedy for wrongful dismissal. The court reasoned that the
collective agreement gave greater protections against wrongful
dismissal than the covenant, and therefore, there was no reason
to utilize the covenant. 90
D.

Recent Use of Implied Covenant

As previously explained, the covenant declined in popularity
as the more conventional and circumscribed public policy tort
and the implied-in-fact contract theories matured. Nevertheless,
the covenant continues to exist in relatively strong form in California,9 1 Arizona, Montana, and possibly Alaska. 92
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. , the California Supreme
Court held that only contract damages are recoverable for breach
of the implied covenant. It did not embrace various restrictions
on the covenant developed by the intermediate appellate court,
such as limiting the covenant to employees with long service" 4
P.2d 1105 (1988) (rejecting implied covenant as theory applicable to employment
terminable at-will-at least where no "improper motivation" shown).
89 728 F.2d 568, 571 (1st Cir. 1984).
90 Id. See also Price v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 20 (D. Mass. 1984)
(no implied covenant claim under Massachusetts law for employee covered by collective bargaining agreement); Kamens v. Summit Stainless, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 324
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (no implied covenant cause of action for dismissal allegedly violative of Fair Labor Standards Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act); High
v. Sperry Corp., 581 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (claim for breach of implied
covenant distinct from statutory age discrimination claim, though based on same
facts; can be maintained independently of statutory procedures under Iowa law);
Azzi v. Western Elec. Co., 19 Mass. App. Ct. 406, 474 N.E.2d 1166, review denied,
394 Mass. 1103, 478 N.E.2d 1274 (1985) (implied covenant cause of action does
not exist for employee covered by collective bargaining agreement). See infra notes
117-46 and accompanying text discussing specific limitations on the covenant.
91 See McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1987)
(California law permits "bad faith" theory of recovery, independent of covenant of
good faith, if employee can show retaliation against employee for conduct unrelated to work).
92 See ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Alaska 1988) (affirming
compensatory damages and reversing punitive damages on implied covenant theory; implied covenant breach not a tort unless public policy involved).
93 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
94 Compare DeHorney v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Say. Assoc., 777 F.2d 440 (9th
Cir. 1985) (employment for nine months insufficient to trigger implied covenant
under California law), withdrawn and rehearing stayed, 784 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1986)
with Gray v. Superior Court (Cipher Data), 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 822, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 570, 573-74 (1986) (lengthy service not essential to cause of action based on
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and/or to employees working in places where some kind of expectation reasonably has arisen that dismissal will be only for certain reasons or will occur only after following certain
procedures. 95 Foley can thus be read as endorsing a broad substantive view of the covenant, while limiting remedy theories.
The Foley court avoided defining what is necessary to demonstrate a breach of the covenant. It noted that the covenant initially was applied as "a kind of safety valve" to which judges
could turn to fill gaps and qualify or limit rights and duties otherwise arising under rules of contract construction combined with
explicit contract language.96 The court reviewed some of the
standards used by California courts, noting that they did not provide a meaningful way to keep cases away from juries and did not
prevent the juries' tendency of ignoring the judge's instructions
in favor of using their own conceptions of fairness and good
faith. While not embracing the limitations summarized in the
preceding paragraph, the Foley court rejected using the covenant
by itself to impose a good cause requirement on terminable atwill employment contracts in the context of whether tort damages should be available.9 7 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted California law as permitting breach of the covenant to
be shown by little more than absence of good cause for termination.9s It is not clear, however, whether this precedent survives
footnote thirty-nine in Foley.99
Montana has developed an interpretation of the covenant
that is only subtly distinguishable from a just cause interpretaimplied covenant). See also McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336 (9th
Cir. 1987) (covenant requires both longevity of employment and policies of employer; plaintiff failed longevity test because he left employer twice in past); Prevost
v. First Western Bank, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1492, 239 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1987) (longevity
of service helpful but not essential; reversir'g summary judgment for employer in
covenant case by employee with slightly more than six months service).
95 See Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 479, 199
Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (1984) (affirming demurrer; construing Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) to imply a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing only when (1) longevity of employment is present, or (2)
the employer has promulgated a policy for adjudicating employee disputes).
96 Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 684, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (quoting Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualizations, 67 CoRNELL L. REV. 810, 812 (1982)).
97 Foley, 47 Cal.3d at 698 n.39, 765 P.2d at 400 n.39, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 238 n.39
(reading covenant to impose good cause requirement would eviscerate employment-at-will rule and California Labor Code section 2922).
98 Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1988) (factfinder may
infer bad faith from absence of just cause for dismissal).
99 Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 698 n.39, 765 P.2d at 400 n.39, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 238 n.39.
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tion.' 0 0 An employer must show a "fair and honest reason" for a
dismissal to escape liability under the covenant.' 0 ' In Gates v. Life
of Montana Insurance Co.,102 the Supreme Court of Montana used
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to obligate the
employer to follow policies in its personnel handbook.10 3 In Dare
v. Montana Petroleum Marketing Co. ,' the court reversed summary
judgment for the employer and held that the plaintiff was entitled
to a trial on questions of job security and improper reasons for
dismissal. The court ruled that the covenant of good faith protects reasonable expectations of job security and that the covenant would be implied where there are "objective
manifestations" by the employer of job security which were relied on by the employee. The "objective manifestations" that
the covenant are not limited to promises made in
would implicate
05
a handbook. 1

In Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital,'0 6 the court affirmed a jury verdict of compensatory and punitive damages for a
respiratory therapist discharged during a probationary period.
The court in Niles v. Big Sky Eyewear,'"7 affirmed judgment on a
jury verdict of $470,000, based on breach of the covenant and
misrepresentation for false information given to law enforcement
authorities resulting in the plaintiff's arrest and termination.
Further, the court approved, by negative implication, a jury instruction that suggested a good cause standard.' 0 8 In Prout v.
100 A just cause interpretation of the covenant is considered infra at notes 272-87
and accompanying text.
101 See Stark v. Circle K. Corp., 230 Mont. 468, 474, 751 P.2d 162, 167 (1988)
("employer need only show fair and honest reason;" $270,000jury verdict affirmed
for employee who refused to sign probationary notice the accuracy of which he
contested).
102 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982), rev'd and remanded, 205 Mont. 304, 668
P.2d 213 (1983) (breach of covenant constitutes a tort and permits punitive
damages).
103 Id. at 183, 638 P.2d at 1067. The court noted that the handbook policies were
not enforceable on a traditional contract theory because the handbook was distributed after plaintiff was hired. See also Kerr v. Gibson's Prods. Co., 226 Mont. 69,
733 P.2d 1292 (1987) (affirming jury verdict for plaintiff on covenant theory; satisfactory work evaluations and handbook, though distributed after hire, created reasonable expectations of job security sufficient to implicate covenant).
104 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984).
105 Id. at 283, 687 P.2d at 1020. The plaintiff alleged no specific promise of employment security, but only cited to raises and other conduct indicating satisfaction
with performance.
106 213 Mont. 488, 693 P.2d 487 (1984).
107 236 Mont. 455, 771 P.2d 114 (1989).
108 See id. at 460, 771 P.2d at 118. The Niles court approved a jury instruction
that: "[E]mployment may be terminated at any time by an employer in the event of
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Sears, Roebuck & Co. ,109 the court held that firing for a false reason
breaches the covenant, even though the employer would have
been free to dismiss for no reason."' 0 In Hobbs v. Pacific Hide &
Fur Depot,"' the Montana Supreme Court found reversible error
in the lower court's failure to instruct the jury that the covenant
arises from objective manifestations by an employer, leading to
reasonable employee expectations."12 Significantly, the court in
Flanigan v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association,"' found
that long term employment, by itself, was sufficient to create the
14
expectations protectable by the covenant."
This line of cases suggests that the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing can be used to impute a promise of employment
tenure which cannot be proven from the facts. Such use of the
implied covenant theory is potentially more far-reaching than
either the implied-in-fact contract or the public policy tort doctrines." 5 The Montana Supreme Court has held, however, that
the implied covenant theory cannot be utilized to enforce employer promises of promotions and salary increases." 6 It is available only to contest employment terminations.
E.

Limitations on Covenant

Outside California and Montana, the implied covenant theory is hedged with various restrictions.' 1 7 The supreme courts of
any willful breach of duty by the employee in the course of employment or if the
employee habitually neglects or is incapable of performing the duties of the employment. However, an employer has a duty to act in good faith and deal fairly in
discharging an employee.").
109 236 Mont. 152, 772 P.2d 288 (1989).
110 Id. at 157, 772 P.2d at 292 (quoting Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp.,
213 Mont. 488, 498-99, 693 P.2d 487, 492 (1984)).
111 236 Mont. 503, 771 P.2d 125 (1989).
112 See id. at 508, 771 P.2d at 129-30 (quoting suggested language for instruction
on remand).
113 221 Mont. 419, 720 P.2d 257 (1986).
114 See id.at 426, 720 P.2d at 261-62 (citing Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg.
Co., 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984)).
115 See Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 213 Mont. 488, 693 P.2d 487
(1984) (plaintiff need not show violation of public policy to prove breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
116 Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc., 233 Mont. 113, 760 P.2d 57 (1988) (affirming summary judgment for employer).
117 See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988),
reh'g denied, 294 Ark. 239, 747 S.W.2d 579 (1988) (recognizing public policy tort
concept, but restricting it to contract remedies under implied covenant doctrine;
employee dismissed allegedly for reporting employer violations of federal contracting standards); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 732 P.2d 1364 (1987)
(affirming judgment for breach of implied covenant on evidence showing employer
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Arizona,11 8 Connecticut,11 9 and North Dakota 120 have expressly
disavowed the notion that a breach of the covenant can be established merely by proving dismissal without good cause. Other
recent cases also reject claims that the covenant
is violated unless
12 1
the employer can demonstrate good cause.
Four principal ways of limiting the covenant have evolved.
First, a breach of the covenant can only be established by showing that an employer failed to follow employer promulgated procedures, upon proof of some other type of employer conduct, or
by communication that has led to reasonable expectations of employment security. 122 Other states require a showing that the
employer has violated some understanding about how employees
would be handled. 123 The Supreme Court of Montana, in Gates v.
Life of Montana Insurance Co. ,124 found that an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing would be breached by the employer's
motive to dismiss to avoid paying retirement benefits); Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 204 Conn. 460, 528 A.2d 1137 (1987) (implied covenant covers essentially same cases as public policy tort or implied-in-fact contract; facts support no
claim on any of three theories).
118 Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 385, 710 P.2d
1025, 1040 (1985) (accepting covenant but declining to require only good cause
termination to escape liability).
''9 Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 572, 479 A.2d 781, 788
(1984) (no action for breach of implied covenant simply upon discharge without
good cause).
120 Wadeson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1984)
(approving jury instruction on good faith; rejecting the unsuccessful plaintiff's argument that the covenant requires the employer to discharge only for good cause).
121 See generally Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 623 F. Supp. 927, 929 (N.D. Ill.
1985), aff'd without opinion, 819 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1987) (covenant of good faith
does not impose an obligation to "be nice or to behave decently in a general way");
Wadeson v. American Family Mutual Ins., 343 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1984) (rejecting
argument that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing imposes an obligation on
the employer to discharge only for just cause); Rompf v. John Q Hammons Hotels,
Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 28 (Wyo. 1984) (implied covenant not breached by discharge for
economic reasons).
122 See also Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984)
(affirming $300,000 verdict for employee dismissed for dating employee of a competing firm; dismissal violated implied covenant because it contravened the employer's established policy of not interfering in employee's private, off-the-job
conduct); Gates v. Life of Montana Ins., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982) (dismissal without following handbook procedures that were not contractually binding
nonetheless a breach of implied contract). See also Murphy v. American Home
Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983) (rejecting
implied covenant as inconsistent with parties' intent: "no obligation can be implied
... which would be inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship").
123 See Gray v. Superior Court (Cipher Data), 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 821, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 570, 573 (1986) (jury, not court, decides whether failure to follow procedures
in personnel manual is breach of covenant).
124 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982).
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failure to follow the policies in its personnel handbook." 5 The
Nevada Supreme Court used the covenant to permit both contract and tort damages for a26"bad faith" breach of a commitment
to 'ay retirement benefits.'
Second, a number of California intermediate appellate cases
suggest that the covenant is available only for employees with
long service. 127 In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. ,128 and Cancellier v.
FederatedDepartment Stores, Inc. ,129 the courts found a breach of the
implied covenant because a long-term employee was discharged
without notice or compliance with customary procedures. It is
not altogether clear from the case law whether dismissal after
long service suffices to establish a breach, or whether it must be
accompanied by employer conduct creating a legitimate expectation of employment security. Further, while five years appears to
be sufficient, it is not clear what qualifies as long service. The
California Supreme Court in Foley, however, has not adopted
these limitations.
The third mode of limiting the covenant is to allow recovery
only in cases where an employee was deprived of compensation
for past service. This approach, appearing mainly in Massachusetts decisions, 13 0 would transform the covenant from wrongful
125 See id. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1067. The court found that the handbook policies
were not enforceable on a traditional contract theory because the plaintiff was hired
two years prior to distribution of the handbook. Id. at 183, 638 P.2d at 1066.
126 K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 45, 732 P.2d 1364, 1369-70 (Nev.
1987) (breach of covenant found because of evidence that employer's motive was to
evade duty to pay retirement benefits; no discussion of public policy regarding retirement benefits suggests public policy tort not necessary).
127 See McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1987) (covenant requires both longevity of employment and policies of employer; plaintiff
failed longevity test because he left employer twice in past); DeHorney v. Bank of
Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 777 F.2d 440, 448 (9th Cir. 1985) withdrawn and rehearing stayed, 784 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1986) (employment for nine months insufficient to trigger implied covenant under California law); Shapiro v. Wells Fargo
Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 479, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (1984) (affirming demurrer; construing Cleary to imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing only when (1) longevity of employment is present, or (2) the employer has
promulgated a policy for adjudicating employee disputes); Prevost v. First Western
Bank, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1492, 239 Cal. Rptr. 161, 168 (1987) (longevity of service
helpful but not essential; reversing summary judgment for employer in covenant
case by employee with slightly more than six months service). But cf. Gray v. Superior Court (Cipher Data), 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570, 573-74 (1986)
(lengthy service not essential to cause of action based on implied covenant).
128 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
129 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982).
130 See infra note 132 (listing Massachusetts cases). See also Wakefield v. Northern
Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1985) (New York law permits implied cove-
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dismissal into a quasi-contract doctrine.1 3 ' Massachusetts courts
have suggested that a breach of the covenant can be shown only
when the employer has acted to deprive the employee
of com1 32
performance.
past
by
earned
been
has
that
pensation
The fourth approach, reflected in the decisions of a number
of states, posits that breach of the covenant can be shown only by
a violation of a public policy.' 3 This was, of course, the factual
1 34
context of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
which gave the implied covenant its start as a wrongful dismissal
doctrine. More recent decisions limit the implied covenant to situations jeopardizing public policy. Borrowing a statutory age
discrimination standard to determine the boundaries of the contractual good faith obligation, the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts, in McKinney v. National Dairy
Council,'35 approved ajury finding that the covenant of good faith
was breached by a dismissal based on age.' 36 In Maddaloni v.
Western Massachusetts Bus Lines, Inc., ms 7 a Massachusetts appeals

court approved a jury finding of a breach of the good faith covenant where the employee was terminated in order for the employer to avoid payment of bonuses. 38 In Wisconsin, the
nant claim for a dismissal motivated by desire to deprive employee of
commissions).
131 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 comment b (1981) (distinguishing quasi-contract from implied contract).
132 See McCone v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 393 Mass. 231, 234, 471 N.E.2d
47, 50 (1984) (suggesting that an implied covenant claim lies only to deny employer
financial windfall resulting from denial of compensation for past services); Siles v.
Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103 (1982), appeal
denied, 386 Mass. 1103, 440 N.E.2d 1176 (1982) (evidence did not support jury
finding of wrongful dismissal; no evidence that employer terminated employee to
retain sales commissions for itself).
133 See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025
(1985) (holding that nurse dismissed for refusing to engage in behavior that might
violate indecent exposure statute could recover on implied covenant theory because public policy would be violated; declining to accept broader California implied covenant doctrine).
134 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
135 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980). The employee claimed that the employer
indicated to him in his job interview that NDC could provide him with stable employment. The court construed those representations into an implied covenant of
good faith and proceeded to apply MAss. GEN. L. ch. 149, § 24A (West 1978) which
prohibits age discrimination as a means to define stable employment. McKinney,
491 F. Supp. at 1118.
136 Id. at 1121.
137 12 Mass. App. 236, 422 N.E.2d 1379 (1981), modified, 386 Mass. 877, 438
N.E.2d 351 (1982).
138 Id. at 241, 422 N.E.2d at 1382 (citations omitted). The employee brought an
action against the employer for breach of a written contract which the employer
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covenant is used instead of the public policy tort in order to limit
damages. In Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. ,'s the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is violated when the discharge "is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing
law."' t40 The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Howard v. Door
Woolen Co. ,41 similarly limited the scope of the implied covenant.
In Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc. ,142 the Supreme Court
of Connecticut hinted that a cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant is identical to a public policy tort,14 1 while rejecting a claim of breach of the implied covenant based solely
upon a discharge without just cause. 4 4 Later, the court suggested that the implied covenant overlaps both45 the public policy
tort and the implied-in-fact contract theories.'
Another stratagem for limiting the implied covenant is to
permit it only for fixed term employment contracts and not for
at-will or indefinite term contracts. 46 This approach is inconsistent with the Restatement (Second) of Contracts which clearly contemplates the application of the covenant to powers reserved to one
party under the contract. Such reserved powers conceptually include the power to terminate.
F. Waivers and Disclaimers
Employers are free to avoid promises of employment tenure
terminated at-will. The contract provided for enhanced compensation to the plaintiff upon the acquisition of Interstate Commerce Commission rights deemed advantageous by the employer. Once acquired, the employer dismissed the plaintiff to
end the extra pay.
139 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
140 Id. at 573, 335 N.W.2d at 840.
141 120 N.H. 295, 297, 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1980) (limiting the Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), approach to reasons for discharges that clearly offend public policy).
142 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984).
143 See id. at 577 n.25, 479 A.2d at 791 n.25.
144 Id. at 572, 479 A.2d at 788.
145 Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 204 Conn. 460, 470-71, 528 A.2d 1137,
1142 (1987) (no implied covenant claim absent public policy jeopardy or employer
conduct defeating reasonable expectations of employee). See also Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988), reh'g denied, 294 Ark. 239, 747
S.W.2d 579 (1988) (recognizing implied covenant where employee was dismissed
for reporting employer violations of federal contracting standards; following
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983)).
146 See Vallone v. Agip Petroleum Co., 705 S.W.2d 757, 759 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)
(good faith obligation may be implied in contracts for a fixed term, but not in contracts for an indefinite term).
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and to publish disclaimers to foreclose reliance on informal
promises. Disclaimers are express statements, typically found in
employment applications or employee handbooks, that put employees on notice that general statements or conduct suggesting
a commitment of employment security should not be relied upon
by the employees.' 4 7 Only a handful of cases have considered
the effect of disclaimers on the implied covenant. Most have held
that the implied covenant cannot be disclaimed or waived.' 48
This conclusion, while consistent with tort obligations, is not
consistent with contract obligations. If the implied covenant is a
contract term supplied by law in the absence of a contrary manifestation of intent by the parties, it should be waivable. Consequently, the cases limiting waiver of the covenant should be
understood as treating the covenant as a tort concept' 49 or simply as wrongly decided.
III.

THE FUTURE OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT AS A SOURCE OF
EMPLOYER OBLIGATION

The courts in most jurisdictions which have accepted the im-

plied covenant have not afforded definitive guidance as to the
limits of the implied covenant doctrine, cautiously adopting it in
particular cases. The covenant remains potentially available for
egregious cases not meeting the requirements of the implied-infact contract or the public policy tort. The covenant might also
evolve into a duty to dismiss only for good cause.
One of the major problems with the implied covenant theory
is its vagueness. It is difficult to limit a jury to the implication of

specific criteria for employer decisions. The same difficulty sends
too many cases to the jury because there are no real standards for
dismissal of complaints or summary judgment.
This section considers the future of the implied covenant,
justifying externally imposed limitations on contract rights in
general and discussing the role of the covenant in a relational
147 See H. PERRirT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, § 4.10 at 189-90, §§ 8.7-

8.8, at 468-72.
148 See Prout v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 236 Mont. 152, 772 P.2d 288 (1989) (atwill disclaimer permitted employer to dismiss employees for no reason, but not for
a "false" reason; dismissal for dishonesty violated covenant because employee not
given chance to offer defense); Stark v. Circle K. Corp., 230 Mont. 468, 751 P.2d
162 (1988) (affirming $270,000 verdict for employee dismissed for refusing to sign
contested probation notice; covenant cannot be waived by disclaimer, and does not
depend on employer representations).
149 See Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983)
(holding that breach of the covenant is a tort).
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view of contracts. This part will then consider three possible interpretations of the covenant as a limitation on employment terminations: as a source of protection for legitimate employee
expectations; as a source of an administrative law type deferential
review of employer decisions, and; finally as a source of an obligation to dismiss only for good cause.
A.

TheoreticalJustificationfor Externally Imposed Obligations

Labor and employment law abounds with limitations on the
exercise of acknowledged contract rights. The implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing may limit an employer's exercise of
the right to terminate an employee-at-will. Similarly, the National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act limit the
exercise of employer rights under collective bargaining agreements and also limit original property concepts when the exercise of those rights impedes collective bargaining. The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) also imposes
fiduciary obligations on employee benefit plan administrators
who exercise discretionary authority. 5 °
1.

Comparison with Fiduciary Obligations

While the standards of good faith and fair dealing are not
necessarily the same as fiduciary standards, the ideas are similar
in that contracting parties may not be able to escape from the
obligation by reserving rights in the contract.' 5 ' Moreover, both
concepts are rooted to some degree in equity and fairness
principles.
The examples of good faith given in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts commentary to section 205 demonstrate the overlap
between the covenant and fiduciary duties. The covenant pro150 See H. PERRrIr, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS CLAIMS LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.13, at 20309 (1990) [hereinafter H. PERRrrr, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS]. Trustees must administer
benefit trusts only in the interest of the beneficiaries, without serving conflicting
interests. The exclusive benefit standard obviously does not permit self-dealing by
the trustee or other fiduciaries. Brink v. DaLesio, 667 F.2d 420,426 (4th Cir. 1982)
(violation of fiduciary standard for trustee to negotiate for rental of office space
with fiduciary who provided free condominium use to trustee). Circuit Judge
Friendly analyzed this duty in the context of a corporate pension plan trusteed by
senior officers of the employer sponsor in Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d
Cir. 1982), noting that trustees of an express trust have the highest fiduciary obligation known to the law. Id. at 272 n.8 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2
comment b (1959)).
151 But see supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (regarding disclaimers).
Before ERISA was enacted, trust law permitted some fiduciary obligations to be
waived. See H. PERRrrr, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS supra note 150, § 4.14, at 210.
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hibits a contracting party from interfering with the other party's
performance, from neglecting the contractual rights of performance and from acting inconsistently with the purpose of the bargain.' 5 2 These requirements are analogous to those embodied in
fiduciary duties.'
The only exception to the general similarity
between good faith and fiduciary duties is the duty of loyalty-in
ERISA terms, the duty to act for the exclusive benefit of the other
54
parties (beneficiaries or participants).
Generally, the common law trust fiduciary obligations 55
which are incorporated into a branch of labor and employment
by ERISA' 56 impose duties of loyalty to beneficiaries and duties
of care in administering the trust.' 5 7 Derived from the duty of
care is a duty to preserve and maintain trust assets, including an
obligation to discover and control the location of trust property,
as well as a duty to investigate the identity of any uncertain beneficiaries and to notify beneficiaries of new gifts. 158 The duty of
care also includes a duty to supervise any agent the trustee may
59
retain, such as an administrator.
152 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comments a, c, d (1981).
153 One reason for imposing fiduciary type obligations on contract promisors is

to expand the range of available damages. This essentially was what the plaintiff
sought in Foley, and is a result of an independent claim for breach of a fiduciary
obligation under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982) (damages imposed on individual fiduciary).
154 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982).
155 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts recognizes 23 duties which arise from the
nature of the fiduciary duty. For a listing of the duties imposed upon the trustee,
see Restatement sections 169-85. Among the most important are the duty to keep
and produce accurate records pertaining to the trust; the duty to administer the
trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary; the duty to furnish information to
beneficiaries; the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill; the duty to take trust
property and to enforce claims; the duty to segregate trust property; the duty to
make trust property productive; the duty to deal impartially with multiple beneficiaries; the duty to participate with co-trustees and to prevent co-trustees from
committing breach of trust; the duty to act under instructions of persons authorized
by trust instrument to control trustee actions unless the instructions violate terms
of the trust or cause a violation of a fiduciary duty.
156 See generally Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148,
152 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (Congress intended to incorporate fiduciary standards of trust law into ERISA); Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985)
(instead of explicitly enumerating all powers and duties of employee benefit plan
trustees, Congress invoked the common law of trusts).
157 Central States, 472 U.S. at 570-71 (characterizing duties incorporated into ERISA from common law).
158 Id. at 570-72.
159 See Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 1988) (trustees breached fidu-

ciary obligations by not correcting situation when they knew administrator was investing trust assets out of motive for personal gain).
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The fiduciary obligations under ERISA are more demanding
than the covenant of good faith in one important respect. While
the fiduciary obligation of loyalty requires that fiduciaries act for
the exclusive benefit of the promisee, 60 the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing only requires that the promisor act
without malice and without ulterior motives which may be irrelevant or extrinsic to the contractual relationship. There is, however, some similarity. In order to pursue contract objectives
faithfully, one must be loyal to the interests of the other party
recognized in the contract. Loyalty to the relationship is therefore a must. Requiring loyalty to the interests of benefit plan
participants is not a requirement of loyalty to their interests in
general, only loyalty to their interests in the plan or relationship.
There are two ways to harmonize the covenant with the fiduciary's duty of loyalty. One theory favorable to employees is to
conclude that contracts of employment are special relationships,
and thus, are equivalent to fiduciary relationships. Then the contract party's implied covenant is a fiduciary obligation. The California Supreme Court, however, rejected this approach in
Foley."'6 The Foley court was motivated by the desire to exclude
tort damages for breaches of the covenant. Therefore, the
court's discussion of special relationship criteria is not entirely
convincing. Indeed, many of the criteria identified by the court
which led it to reject a special relationship finding appear to be
met by most employment relationships.
The four features identified by the Foley court were: (1) one
of the parties to the contract enjoys a superior position in the
formation of the contract to the extent that the party is able to
dictate the terms of the contract; (2) the weaker party does not
160 As of yet there are few cases which have applied the fiduciary standard under
ERISA to contract promisors, rather than to persons qualifying as common law
trustees. The courts, confronted with the issue, have frequently used artificial distinctions between multiple roles performed by the same person or entity and fiduciary obligations, arguing that if an employer serves its own interest at the expense of
plan participants, it is not acting as a fiduciary. This, of course, avoids the fiduciary
requirement for exclusive pursuit of the interests of the plan participants. See Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1989) (plan entitled only
non-dismissed employees to early retirement benefits; trustees have no discretion
regarding dismissal; company not acting in fiduciary capacity but as employer when
it decides to dismiss); Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d 279, 285 (3d Cir.
1989) (approving provision permitting early retirement, among other things, when
employer determined that its interest would be served by early retirement; employer decisions about business interests are business decisions not fiduciary
decisions).
161 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1983).
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enter into the contract primarily for profit, but to secure an essential service or product, financial security or piece of mind; (3)
the relationship that evolves is one in which the weaker party
places its trust and confidence in the larger entity, and; (4) the
stronger party's conduct indicates an intent to62 frustrate the
weaker party's enjoyment of the contract rights.
In most employment relationships the employer enjoys a relatively stronger position which enables it to dictate the terms of
the employment contract. While the employee's purpose in entering into an employment relationship generally is profit, the
sought after benefit is not usually of an entrepreneurial character. Rather, it is to enjoy minimal financial security and well-being. In most instances, the employee places trust and confidence
in the employer, at least to the extent of permitting this larger
entity to adjust the terms of the relationship. Further, employees
allow employers to organize and direct the fortunes of the enterprise, an organization in which both have a stake. The presence
of the final criterion, the employer's desire to deprive an employee of benefits, varies depending on the motive behind the
termination of employment.
The Foley court concluded that these factors do not exist in
the usual employment relationship. 163 It did, however, distinguish between insurance and employment relationships. The
court posited that an employee can turn to the marketplace in
order to find other work. Alternatively, an insured cannot turn to
the marketplace to find another source of reimbursement for a
suffered loss. Further, it is likely that the financial interests of the
employer and the employee will converge, while that of the insurer and the insured are fundamentally opposed.' 6"
Interpreting the duty of loyalty broadly is another means by
which to close the gap between fiduciary duties and the implied
covenant on the duty of loyalty. Employers and employees share
a common goal in the success of the enterprise. An employer
generally owes the employees a certain duty of loyalty. This duty
mandates that the employer run an efficient enterprise, weeding
out incompetent or misbehaving individual employees. Thus,
the duty of loyalty is akin to the duty of loyalty in an employee
benefit plan where the fiduciary serves the interests of the benefi162
163
164

Id. at 691-92, 765 P.2d at 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33.
Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 395, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
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ciaries by rejecting certain individual benefit claims.' 65
2.

Comparison with Prima Facie Tort

The scope of the implied covenant is similar to the scope of
the prima facie tort when applied to an employment relationship.
Both incorporate the idea that conduct that is not ordinarily actionable can become actionable because of the state of mind of
the actor. Both the implied covenant and the prima facie tort
allow employees to recover damages when a dismissal was based
on ulterior motives or accompanied by a subjective intent to injure. 6' 6 Under both theories, an employer can escape liability by
demonstrating a legitimate economic justification for the
dismissal.
An analysis using a good faith or a fiduciary standard to evaluate the defendant's conduct is difficult to distinguish from the
kind of inquiry involved in both a prima facie tort analysis and an
intentional interference with contract tort analyses. 167 When
confronted with either type of tort allegation, the court must determine if the defendant was motivated by illegitimate considerations or used improper means. This is done through a balancing
of the interests of the plaintiff and the defendant. This inquiry
may be broader than the good faith inquiry depending on
whether the existence of ulterior motives implies bad faith. A
motive is ulterior whenever it is not legitimate. The fiduciary
standard is more demanding than either the propriety or good
faith standards because a simple showing of motive other than
for the benefit of the plaintiff is enough to establish a breach of
165 The exclusive benefit standard permits consideration of the future interests of
all plan beneficiaries. See Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 865 F.2d 364,
373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (exclusive benefit includes interests other than narrow pecuniary interest; rejecting a fiduciary breach claim against profit sharing plan administrator for stock evaluation). For example, a plan administrator may consider
the effect of a request on the actuarial soundness of a trust fund. See Hansen v.
Western Greyhound Retirement Plan, 859 F.2d 779, 782 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (approving consideration of actuarial underpinnings of plan).
166 See Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 375 Pa. Super. 1, 16, 543 A.2d 1148, 1156 (1988)
(expressly recognizing that Pennsylvania prima facie tort theory is independent of
public policy tort, but affirming nonsuit because employer malice not shown);
Rinehimer v. Luzerne County Community College, 372 Pa. Super. 480, 491-92,
539 A.2d 1298, 1303-04 (1988) (accepting idea that recovery can occur for ulterior
employer motive, independent of public policy, but finding legitimate motive from
evidence).
167 See H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, §§ 5.21-5.22, at 288-94.
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the requisite mental state standard. 168
The covenant of good faith need not be viewed as a source
of obligation fully external to the contract. Professor Fried
pointed out that the obligation to perform in good faith can be
interpreted as reinforcing the purposes of the contract and requiring the parties to conduct themselves consistent with their
bargain.' 69 The covenant of good faith thus can be understood
as an aid to contract interpretation, essentially reinforcing purpose, trade custom, and course of dealing pre-and post-bargain
as standards by which party performance can bejudged. This is a
limited view of the covenant, within a classical or neoclassical
view of contract law. The covenant can be given wider sway, still
within contract rather than tort law, under a relational view of
contract.
B.

Relational Contract Model

The implied covenant of good faith was noted in the introduction as a prominent reflection of the relational contract doctrine. In the relational contract school, "parties treat their
170
contracts more like marriages than like one-night stands."'
Stewart Macauley and Ian Macneil emphasized that parties to real
world transactions do not concern themselves with the traditional, classical, model of contract formation and administration.
Rather, they work things out in order to maintain continuing
relationships.
Obligations are not frozen in an initial bargain. They evolve
over time as circumstances change, guided by norms of the particular community within which the relation exits. The object of
contracting is to establish and define a cooperative relationship,
not merely to allocate risk. If performance is neglected by either
party, the other party is expected to be accommodating rather
than to insist on technical performance. The sanction for unacceptable performance is to terminate the relationship and to refuse to deal in the future. 17 ' The coercive power of the state,
activated through breach-of-contract litigation, exists as a means
of changing bargaining power, but it does not preoccupy the par168 See infra notes 249-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standards
for determining a breach.
169 See C. FRIED, supra note 2, at 85 (explaining how good faith derives its meaning from the contract itself).
170 Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract
Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 565, 568-69.
171 Id. at 569.

714

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:683

their relationship or in seeking remedies for
ties in defining 72
disappointment.

Professor Macneil identified ten traditional contract norms:
(1) role integrity (requiring consistency, involving internal conflict, and being inherently complex); (2) reciprocity (simply
stated as the principle of getting something back for something
given); (3) implementation of planning; (4) effectuation of consent; (5) flexibility; (6) contractual solidarity; (7) the restitution,
reliance, and expectation interest (the linking norms); (8) creaof
tion and restraint of power (the power norm); (9) propriety
173
means, and; (10) harmonization with the social matrix.
He also identified five significant norms in established contractual relations: (1) role integrity; (2) preservation of the relation; (3) harmonization of relational conflict; (4) propriety of
means, and; (5) supracontract norms. 174 These are the main relational contract norms. Professor Macneil acknowledged that relational and discrete contract theories are not entirely
separate. 175 Significant aspects of the contract-as-promise analysis acknowledge the relational characteristics of modern contract
76
law. 1

Preservation of the relation is "an intensification and expansion of the traditional norm of contractual solidarity."'' 77 The
preservation norm in relational contract theory encompasses the
reciprocity norm of traditional contract theory. This is so because "contractual relations cannot continue without reciprocId. at 572.
Macneil, Values in Contract Internal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 340, 347
(1983) [hereinafter Macneil, Values in Contract].
174 See id. at 361.
175 Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
483 [hereinafter Macneil, Relational Contract].
176 Beyond that, much of the relational contract literature, especially that of the
critical legal studies advocates, is negative. It criticized discrete contract and contract-as-promise views without substituting a unified analytical framework of its
own. In addition, of course, much of the critical legal studies relational contract
analysis has a strong ideological cast, for example, rejecting the legitimacy of employer control over the workplace because it rejects the managerial view of the firm.
See, e.g., Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 621 n.34, 636,
721 (embracing relational view and expressing more sympathy with critical legal
studies movement than with market models in developing property theory to protect employees threatened with plant closings). Professor Macneil viewed the most
desirable direction of relational contract development as toward "smallness," apparently meaning relatively autonomous units of self-governance. Macneil, Values
in Contract, supra note 173, at 418.
177 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 173, at 362.
172

173
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78

Consideration is a manifestation of the reciprocity norm,
but it operates in the background of an ongoing contract relation.17 9 Part III, F of this article reformulates some of these relational theory value concepts into rules, at least in the form of
rebuttable presumptions.
Macneil identified labor and employment law commentators
Clyde Summers, Philip Selznick, and David Feller, among others,
as intellectual members of the relational contract school. 8 ° The
Feller and Cox formulations, for example, fit comfortably into
the Macneil formulation of relational contract. David Feller
noted the tendency of the United States Supreme Court to view
collective bargaining agreements as a kind of governmental code
rather than as a contract,' 8 ' while acknowledging that some aspects of labor law continue to embrace a contract notion. 182 He
emphasized that employers and unions do not write collective
bargaining agreements primarily as documents to be applied in
ity."'

court, 18 3 but rather to establish a system of ongoing rules to gov-

ern the workplace. 8 4 Archibald Cox, writing earlier, 8 5
agreed.186 And, of course, the Supreme Court's treatment of collective agreements as a kind of "constitution" for the workplace
in the Steelworkers Trilogy, 1 8 7 was a highly relational outlook.
Some anomalies in applying a classical promise-based con178

Id. at 363.

179 Id.
180 See Macneil, Relational Contract, supra note 175, at 494 n.40, 497,498 n.59 (noting Lon Fuller and Karl Llewellyn as incorporating relational contract ideas into
promise-centered neoclassical contract theory); Macneil, Relational Contract, supra
note 175, at 494 n.40 (citing Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts,
78 YALE L.J. 525 (1969)); Macneil, Relational Contract, supra note 175, at 498 n.59
(citing Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999
(1955); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958)).
181 Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
663, 704 (1973) (rejectingJustices Black and Fortas' views embracing a self-government view of the collective agreement).
182 Id. at 718 (when union presents employee's claim, collective agreement is
viewed as instrument of government; when employee sues both union and employer, collective agrement is viewed as contract).
183 Id. at 720.
184 Id. at 720-71 (function of rules, rule-modifying, and rule-applying institutions
in meeting needs of employers, unions, and employees in ongoing relationship).
185 Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956).
186 Id. at 605 (principles for handling collective agreements should not be imposed from traditional legal doctrine; "they should be drawn out of the institutions
of labor relations and shaped to their needs").
187 Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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tract theory to major employment contractual controversies can
be resolved by using the relational contract theory. For example,
an attractive feature of the relational theory for employment contracts is the ease with which it accommodates the past practice
concept in interpreting collective bargaining agreements and
statutory status quo obligations under sections two and six, of
the Railway Labor Act' s8 and section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act.' 8 ' Under the relational theory, the parties expect that the terms of their relationship will evolve. There is no
need for formalities to validate new practices to make them part
of the contract. If it is unobjectionable, simply doing something
becomes part of the contractual relationship and a stronger obligation evolves the longer the action continues. The classical contract-as-promise theory is able to accommodate this idea, but
with more difficulty. Classical and neoclassical theory use courseof-dealing and trade usage as a means of interpreting the terms
of pre-existing contracts. 9 ° The broad use of extrinsic evidence
188 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, 156 (1986). The United States Supreme Court revisited
the basic question of practices becoming terms of collective bargaining agreements
in two cases decided in the 1988 term: Conrail v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 2477 (1989) and Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Ry. v. Labor Executives' Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 2584 (1989). The analysis in these two cases reopened the once debated
issue between Justice Harlan and the majority concerning whether rules for contract interpretation within the Railway Labor Act should generally take an objective
or subjective view of party expectations derived from conduct. See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line v. UTU, 396 U.S. 142, 155 (1969). This is a transplanting of a
much earlier debate between Williston and Corbin. In Conrail, the Court acknowledged that collective bargaining agreements may include implied as well as express
terms. Conrail, 109 S. Ct. at 2483. "Furthermore, it is well established that the
parties' 'practice, usage and custom' is of significance in interpreting their agreement." Id. at 2485 (citing Transportation Union v. Union Pacific R.R., 385 U.S.
157, 161 (1966) (collective agreements not like common law contracts; must use
course of performance, course of dealing and other workplace realities to develop
common law of the workplace; adjustment board must address competing claims of
two unions)). The ConrailCourt also acknowledged the legal significance but did so
without resolving the dispute regarding whether past practices have risen to the
level of an implied contract term. Id. In Pittsburgh& Lake Erie, the majority quoted
Justice Harlan's dissent in Detroit & Toledo Shore Line, implying agreements from
practice. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, 109 S. Ct. at 2584, 2593. The context of the brief
discussion in Pittsburgh & Lake Erie suggests that the Court viewed the status quo
obligation as attaching only to those practices to which an actual subjective agreement can be implied. See id. The Conrail Court determined that "reporting at Lang
Yard, we thought, had been the unquestioned practice for many years, and we considered it reasonable for employees to deem it sufficiently established that it would
not be changed without bargaining and compliance with the status quo provisions
of the RLA." Conrail, 109 S. Ct. at 2594 (explaining basis for Shore Line majority
reasoning and hinting at a criticism of it).
189 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1973).
190 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTrRACTS §§ 219-23, at 146-60 (1981).
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is a relational approach."'9 But this interpretation approach has
difficulty dealing with consensual practices that deviate significantly from the express terms of the written instrument. It is
ironic to say that conduct "interprets" terms when it practically
rebuts express terms or dramatically changes them.
Consideration is obviously a reflection of the reciprocity
norm. The reciprocity norm in relational contracts is easily satisfied. The fact that the parties deal with each other in the context
of a relationship is enough to give validity to the commitments
they make to each other.
The good faith and fiduciary obligation concepts are an integral part of the relational theory, and therefore, they are compatible. Under the relational theory, parties are obligated to behave
in a way that promotes the relationship, and in a way that is consistent with the needs and expectations of both parties. This is a
central concept of the relational theory and a virtual restatement
of the good faith idea. The covenant idea is embodied in Macneil's preservation-of-the-relationship and propriety-of-means
norms. 192
The author's main problem with the relational theory of contract is that it does not provide doctrinal rules to help decide
cases. 93 In effect, the relational theory meshes the sharp distinctions of classical or neoclassical contract theories by providing
useful insights on how real world parties formulate and administer contracts. But these insights simultaneously intensify the difficulty in deciding a particular dispute. One reality may be
Professor Macauley's concept that the employers and employees
are not preoccupied with classical contract doctrines. Courts,
however, understand classical and neoclassical contract doctrines
and seek legitimate methods under such doctrines to enforce
contracts.
Professor Barnett has considered the relationship between
the practical necessity to decide cases under the rule of law and
191 Macneil characterized the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as "the largest body
of American relational contracts scholarship." Macneil, Relational Contract, supra
note 175, at 497. Dean Murray emphasized the difference between the approaches
of the Restatement (First) and Restatement (Second) on contract interpretation, with the
latter Restatement which was significantly more hospitable to extrinsic evidence as a
guide to interpretation. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRCTrs § 106-07, at 229-33;
§ 109-14, at 238-46 (1974).
192 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 173, at 340-61.
193 Macneil himself acknowledged that relational contract theories lack a core
theme like discreteness for the classical and neoclassical theories. Id. at 383. The
relational theorists agree mainly on their criticisms of other theories. Id.
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under legal theories. 19 4 In Barnett's view, the law evolves from
the litigation of human disputes. Sometimes judges feel cognitive dissonance between existing legal doctrine and justice. It is
in these situations that judges change legal doctrine. For example, the employment-at-will rule was sometimes narrowed in this
manner by the recognition of the three wrongful dismissal theories. Alternatively, cognitive dissonance is sometimes expressed
by commentators and the public when judges faithfully apply an
accepted legal doctrine even though the result seems unjust. In
these situations, commentators or legislators may seek changes
in the law. In addition, commentators develop new theoretical
justifications for judicial decisions which serve practical reality,
but are inconsistent with current legal theory. This is perhaps
the best way to view relational contract theory.
Relational contract theory is not a replacement for classical
and neoclassical contract theory in labor and employment law.
Relational contract theory is a way to reduce the artificiality of
applying formal contract law doctrines to continuing legal relationships that are best thought about in contractual terms. While
relational contract theory is in its infant stage in terms of a comprehensive body of legal rules and doctrine, it has legitimated
some begrudgingly recognized doctrines. The implied covenant
is one such doctrine.
Relational contract theory adds to the assessment of the implied covenant by clarifying the ways in which the covenant
should be understood and applied in actual cases. Relational
contract theory legitimates the implied covenant and assists in
directing its further evolution. The covenant, as a manifestation
of the relational aspect of employment contracts, obligates both
parties to act in a way which serves the original purpose of the
relationship' 9 5 and to preserve the relationship whenever
practicable.' 9 6
C. Administrative Law Model
A limited role for the covenant is to reinforce a perceptible
trend in employment contract law toward an administrative law
model of contract -formation and modification. Under this
194 See Barnett, Foreword: Of Chickens and Eggs-The Compatibility of Moral Rights and
ConsequentialistAnalyses, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 611, 622, 630 (1989).
195 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200, at 82 (1981) (contracts
should be interpreted to serve their purposes).
196 See infra notes 215-20, and accompanying text (exploring relationship as it
relates to breach).
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model, an employer is like an administrative agency and employees are like persons affected by administrative agency decisions.
The employer unilaterally sets terms of the employment contract; an administrative agency unilaterally promulgates regulations. These terms of employment are enforceable against the
employer; administrative rules are enforceable against the agency
promulgating them. 97 The employer can change the terms of
employment through the same processes used to promulgate
them initially; an administrative agency can amend its regulations
through the same processes used to promulgate them initially.' 98
An employee has no vested right in the maintenance of a particular term of employment unless a condition precedent specified in
the term has occurred before the term is modified. Similarly, a
person affected by an administrative regulation has no vested interest in the maintenance of the regulation unless a particular
event leading to the creation of rights under the original regulation has occurred before the regulation is amended. The administrative law model is consistent with the relational contract
model of the employment relation and the bureaucratization of
work. 199

This view of employment contract formation and modification is entirely consistent with the way ERISA is applied to employee benefit plans. Employers must publish plans in writing.
They may amend them, absent some direct conflict with a provision of ERISA, and assuming they have reserved the right to
197 See generally Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 857 (1985) (agency must follow its
own rules); Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Re-

port, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239,,249 (1986) (agency must follow its own rules).
198 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs' Ass'n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983)

(applying same standard for judicial review of seat belt rule revocation as for initial
promulgation of rule).
199 Linzer and others have commented on the role of contract law and direct
government regulation in an increasingly bureaucratized employment relation.
Professor Matthew Finkin analyzed the evolution of wrongful dismissal common

law as a natural by-product of the bureaucratization of work. See Finkin, The
Bureaucratizationof Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 733

(arguing that no legal principles changed when it became common for employees
to enforce implied contract rights based on employee manuals and handbooks;
rather, the nature of the employment relation changed, with internal labor markets
largely replacing external labor markets). Professor Linzer developed an integrated view of public and private law theories, using employment-at-will as a case
study of what he views as the breakdown of private law theory. See Linzer, The
Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323 (1986); S. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS,
UNIONS, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY

(1985).
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amend them. Courts hearing ERISA cases do not concern themselves much with traditional contract formation issues. Courts
typically ignore issues of whether a plan participant had knowledge of a particular plan provision he seeks to enforce or
whether he gave consideration.
The wrongful dismissal implied contract case law is less
clear. There is, however, a branch of implied-in-fact contract
doctrine, exemplified by the New Jersey Supreme Court's case of
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. ,200 that closely follows the administrative law model, while not expressly identifying the analogy.
Under the Woolley doctrine, the fact that an employer puts a term
of employment in a handbook gives it special status and makes it
enforceable without any need to prove knowledge of the term.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Foley is consistent
with this analysis. In fact, most state courts are following
. 0
Woolley '
The covenant facilitates the administrative law paradigm because it removes the doctrinal awkwardness of dispensing with an
actual plaintiff knowledge requirement in the context of bargainbased or reliance-based contract validation. There are two types
of problems with this approach. First, the policies supporting administrative law concepts are considerably different from the policies supporting employment contract enforcement. Second, the
administrative law model fails to protect employee expectations
in a variety of common circumstances.
The policies supporting administrative law concepts are
rooted in the need to ensure accountability for official decisions
99 NJ. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
See, e.g., Coelho v. Posi-Seal Int'l, Inc., 208 Conn. 106, 118, 544 A.2d 170, 176
(1988) (promise of employment security becomes enforceable as soon as employee
enters employment; no reliance beyond performance of regular services legally required as consideration); Cannon v. National By-Products, Inc., 422 N.W.2d 638
(Iowa 1988) (rejecting requirement for special consideration to support promise to
dismiss only for good cause or to support post-employment incorporation of personnel policies; facts and discussion suggest continuing employment enough);Jackson v. Action for Boston Community Dev., 403 Mass. 8, 525 N.E.2d 411 (1988)
(remaining with employer after, or commencing employment upon, receiving employee manual can supply necessary consideration to incorporate manual's terms
into employment contract; denying recovery on facts of case); Stratton v. Chevrolet
Motor Div., 229 Neb. 771, 774, 428 N.W.2d 910, 913 (1988) (employee can "accept" written or oral limitations on at-will termination right by continuing employment after knowing of them; no knowledge and no breach in instant case); Panto v.
Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 735-39, 547 A.2d 260, 264-66 (N.H.
1988) (adopting general principle that employee accepts employer offer by continuing normal work; characterizing Woolley as relaxing traditional contract principles;
applying traditional unilateral contract principles in layoff compensation case).
200
201
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and conduct. Because the legislature is accountable through the
elective process and administrative agencies are not, administrative agencies lack the power to make rules unless they can
demonstrate a delegation of authority from the legislature in sufficiently specific terms so that courts can ascertain whether the
agency rules are within the power delegated.2 °2 Reinforcing this
idea of accountability is the notion that official decisions should
be rational, and that even if agency rules are within delegated
powers, they also must be supported by logical explanation and
factual support. These legal concepts are not supplemented by
any idea that persons affected by agency rules have a contractual
relationship with the agency. Even though the end point may be
similar between agency rule making and employment terms set
by employers, the starting points are entirely different.
The law enforces employment contracts like other contracts
to protect private expectations based on promises. Adoption of
the administrative law model is not inconsistent with this goal,
but it cuts off the enforcement of rfiany types of expectations that
deserve enforcement according to traditional contract principles.
If, for example, an employee makes a specific inquiry of appropriate employer authority about the terms of his benefit plan or
about the circumstances under which he can be dismissed and
receives specific oral promises in return, the employee is likely to
form much greater and stronger expectations around this oral
exchange than around particular language in a long and legalistic
employee benefit plan or handbook written by non-lawyer personnel specialists.
Yet the administrative law model of employment contract
formation would not protect the expectation. The same result is
obtained, of course, under the case law manifesting reluctance to
enforce oral commitments in connection with employee benefit
plans.

D.

°

3

The Expectations Enforcement Model

Enforcing employment contracts, like the general law of contracts itself, is justified in terms of social goals. The law has not
always enforced promises 2°4 and has not enforced informal em202 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980) (OSHA health standard for benzene not within delegated authority).
203 See H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 150, § 3.25, at 164.
204 See H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE COrRACT 45-46 (1961). See gen-

erally C. FRIED, supra note 2, at 16-17 (concepts of fairness and justice were the only
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ployer promises until relatively recently. 20 5
The law began to enforce certain promises as society became
larger and more complex and individuals found it difficult to
reach their desired goals without the help of others.2 °6 In order
to rationalize an increasingly interdependent society it was necessary to create a system which bound individuals to their
promises.20 7 Otherwise, individuals would be less likely to make
reciprocal promises and the interdependent economic framework would function inefficiently. This general description of the
policy motivations for contract law fits the evolution of the American workplace.
Modern rules of contract construction and contract formation serve the expectation goal by abandoning formalities in
favor of giving effect to objective indications that expectations
were reasonably induced by promises under circumstances that
should leave a promisor to anticipate that the promise would
have an effect. The clear trends in wrongful dismissal implied-infact contract law is to embrace these ideas permitting flexible
proof of employer statements or conduct that might give rise to
expectations of employment security in the total context of the
employment relation.20 8
Hobbs v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot 209 is a relatively pure example of an expectations approach to the covenant. In Hobbs, the
Montana Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision
based on inadequate instructions regarding an employer's implied covenant of good faith. The court found that the jury instructions neglected to include the fact that the covenant arose
from objective manifestations by an employer which gave rise to
conventions binding a person to his work before the law undertook to enforce
contracts).
205 See H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, §§ 1.2-1.12, at 2-30 (re-

viewing erosion of the employment-at-will rule and partial replacement by impliedin-fact contract theory).
206 L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 98 (3d ed. 1972).

207 Harold Havighurst noted that, with increased technology and a greater division of labor, groups become larger and intercourse with other groups becomes
more extensive. H. HAVIGHURST, supra note 204, at 15. With this division and specialization human objectives become more individualized and complex. Id. With-

out the legal obligations created by contracts this system would not function as
satisfactorily.
208 See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1983).
209 236 Mont. 503, 771 P.2d 125 (1989).
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reasonable employee expectations. 210

The real problem with a pure employee expectations approach is the possibility of selective or imaginative recollection of
statements on the part of plaintiffs. Indeed this concern provided the original motivation for the parol evidence rule as well
as for the statute of frauds. The weight accorded to subjective
employee expectations in formulating a breach standard for the
implied covenant should therefore be influenced by the degree to
which one believes the motivations for those two old common
law rules apply in the modern employment context.
E. Implied Covenant as a Source of an Obligation to Dismiss Only for
Good Cause
Although the argument that a breach of the covenant can be
shown merely by proving a dismissal without good cause has
been rejected by three state supreme courts, 2 1 1 the implied covenant idea is broad enough in -theory to impose an obligation 2 to
12
dismiss only for good cause on employers as a matter of law.
It is a small theoretical step, albeit a major policy step, to translate "good faith and fair dealing" into terminating employment
only for legitimate employer related reasons, i.e., good cause.
1. Disadvantages of Implied Good Cause Interpretation
of Covenant
The principal argument against using the implied covenant
to impose a good cause requirement is that employers will be
discouraged from dismissing employees who should be dismissed, therefore causing the efficiency of the economic system
to suffer. This is a concern that should be taken seriously. Too
often social commentators view work as an activity aimed at pro210 Id. at 508, 771 P.2d at 129-30 (quoting suggested language for instruction on
remand).
211 See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 385, 710 P.2d
1025, 1040 (1985) (accepting covenant but declining to interpret it so as to require
good cause to escape liability); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558,
559, 479 A.2d 781, 782 (1984) (no action for breach of implied covenant wholly
upon discharge without just cause); Wadeson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
343 N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1984) (approving jury instruction on good faith, rejecting the unsuccessful plaintiff's argument that the covenant requires the employer to discharge only for good cause).
212 See Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 384, 710 P.2d at 1039 (California cases come close
to good cause interpretation of covenant). But see Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841
F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1988) (factfinder can infer breach of covenant from the
absence of good cause).
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viding benefits to employees and capitalists only. Work is more
than that. Work is the way in which the society is organized.
Work produces and delivers food, clothing, housing, healthcare,
childcare, and recreational activities. When work is performed
inefficiently or incompetently because of labor and employment
law, labor and employment law harms consumers.
The efficiency detriment resulting from a good cause dismissal requirement does not arise because the rule directly prevents
dismissing inefficient or misbehaving employees. Indeed, a good
cause rule should improve efficiency because it theoretically prevents dismissal of employees whose retention will improve employer performance. The detriment results from added
transaction costs when employees are dismissed for cause and
cause actually exists. In a certain proportion of these cases, an
employee who deserves to be fired nevertheless contests the dismissal and employers must litigate. Even when the employer
wins, litigation costs can be significant. Even when an employee
does not contest the dismissal, internal review costs before dismissal decisions are likely to be increased by any new restriction
on employment terminations.
It is appropriate to be concerned about these costs, but it
also is appropriate to know their magnitude. The marginal costs
associated with moving from the status quo to a good cause rule
may be low. Most large employers already review terminations
and apply their own internal prohibition against dismissals without good cause. For such employers, the marginal cost in terms
of reviewing dismissal decisions before they are effectuated
would be zero. A certain proportion of dismissed employees are
motivated to challenge their dismissals under existing law, alleging race, sex, age, or handicap discrimination or asserting a common law wrongful dismissal claim. Also, one should not forget
possible litigation over unemployment compensation. It may be
that a proportion of dismissed employees motivated to sue would
not be higher if a good cause standard were substituted for the
present diversity of prohibitions.
2.

Advantages of Interpreting Covenant as Good Cause
Obligation

The easiest way to simplify employee dismissal is to apply an
across the board good cause standard for dismissal. This would
relieve employers and employees of the guessing game they must
play on multiple occasions when the dismissed employee perse-
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veres in his or her claim. The best way to establish an across the
board good cause standard is through legislation. But, failing
legislation, the implied covenant also provides a way to establish
a standard, as the Montana Supreme Court has shown. In Montana employers are burdened to show a "fair and honest reason"
for a dismissal to escape liability under the covenant. 3
There is an additional benefit of interpreting the implied
covenant to burden the employer to establish good cause: it creates an incentive for the employer community to favor balanced
legislation. A difficulty with such an interpretation of the covenant is that it creates a disincentive for the plaintiff bar to favor
legislation, although limiting damages as the Foley court did,
leaves some bargaining room for plaintiff lawyers as well as employer lawyers.
F. Covenant as a Rebuttable Good Cause Presumption
The Corbin view, discussed earlier, suggested that the covenant is a way of fleshing out the express terms of a contract, in
order to fulfil expectations created by the overall contractual relation-a highly relational view, though Corbin did not use that
term.
According to this concept, it would be most appropriate to
treat the covenant as a rebuttable presumption of good cause,
when that seems most consistent with the employment relationship, and as something else when that seems most appropriate.
A day laborer, for example, hardly could be said to have reasonable expectations, foreseeable to the employer, that he would
have job security beyond the day in question. It is not faithful to
the Corbin view to impose a job security obligation through the
covenant under such circumstances. On the other hand, the day
laborer may have legitimate expectations that he will not be terminated before the day is over and it does make sense to give the
covenant that interpretation.
Under this view of the covenant, all of the circumstances of
the relation should be significant to defining the good faith and
fair dealing obligation; handbook language or other express
commitments may be helpful, but they are not the focus of the
213 See Stark v. Circle K. Corp., 230 Mont. 468, 475-76, 751 P.2d 162, 167 (Mont.
1988) (affirming $270,000jury verdict for employee who refused to sign probationary notice the accuracy of which he contested; employer must show "fair and honest reason for termination"). After the covenant developed in Montana, its
legislature enacted comprehensive wrongful dismissal legislation.
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inquiry, as in the implied-in-fact contract doctrine. The way in
which the employer has historically treated other employees similarly situated to the plaintiff is more important to the plaintiff's
expectations than what a particular supervisor or the personnel
department said to the employee.
IV.

COVENANT AS

GOOD

CAUSE OBLIGATION IN PRACTICE

This part explores a good cause interpretation of the covenant in greater detail, considering the practical issues of the allocation of decision-making responsibility in a dismissal
controversy among employer judge, and jury. The preceding
section presented some ideas for making application of the implied covenant more principled. The following section considers
how some of those limitations can be applied in practice.
The covenant can give effect to the relational theory of contract by being interpreted to obligate the parties to act so as to
maintain and preserve the relationship. Thus, the covenant
would obligate an employer to use progressive discipline and
other rehabilitative approaches, much as arbitrators imply such
obligations into a good cause commitment. 21 4 On the other
hand, when the employee or employer acts to repudiate the relationship, the covenant and the relational contract theory also embrace the idea that terminating the relationship is the most
appropriate remedy. The difficulty is deciding what kind of conduct or performance falls on one side of the line or the other.
This part assumes that the covenant of good faith has
evolved into an implied good cause requirement. It considers
how such an implied requirement would operate in practice, focusing especially on the responsibility for deciding what constitutes good cause for dismissal.
A.

What Constitutes a Breach?

Traditional interpretations of good cause obligations require
an employer to continue the contract of employment until the
occurrence of one of the following conditions subsequent:2 1 5 the
employer no longer has the economic need for anyone in the em214 See H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, § 3.5, at 128-30.
215 J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs 385 (3d ed. 1977). A condition subsequent is any fact, the existence or occurrence of which by agreement of

the parties operates to discharge a duty of performance after it has become
absolute.

1990]

IMPLIED COVENANT

727

ployee's job;2 16 the employee engages in misconduct, or; the employee's job performance is unsatisfactory. All three items are
classified as good cause for dismissal. Alternatively, of course,
the employer could be obligated only to follow certain procedures in terminating employees. 217 In the case of a promise to
follow procedures, dismissal of an employee without following
the procedures constitutes a breach.
Conceptually, the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is breached when an employer terminates an employee without a reason which is rationally related to the employer's legitimate business interests. Professor Macneil's
relational contract values, applied in the following paragraphs,
develop a breach-of-covenant theory for the employment
relation.21 8
The reciprocity norm means that past exchange between the
parties justifies imposing future restrictions on the employer's
right to terminate. The longer the relationship, the more appropriate the restrictions. Conversely, the covenant applied to a day
laborer should impose few restrictions on the employer's power
to dismiss.
The power relationship norm requires a counterpoise to employer power. If an adequate counterpoise exists because of bargaining power evidenced through an individual contract of
employment or because of a collective bargaining representative,
then there is less need to impose limitations through the
covenant.
The legitimacy of means norm 2 ' 9 requires something similar
to what arbitrators require as due process. On the other hand, if
an employer has promised a facially fair procedure for deciding
disputes and requires at least that an objectively reasonable basis
for employer decisions be found to exist in such procedure, then
the law should not substitute a different standard of employer
conduct.
216 In Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., 741 F.2d 1486 (6th Cir. 1984), the
Sixth Circuit suggested that the rationale of Toussaint did not extend to a layoff. Id.
at 1500. Rather, the court observed, that Toussaint involved removal of an employee from a position that continued to exist, while a layoff involves elimination of
the position itself. Id. See also Rompf v. John Q Hammons Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d
25, 29 (Wyo. 1984) (no breach of handbook procedures by discharge for economic
reasons).
217 See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 631 (Minn. 1983).
218 Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 173, at 374-76.
219 See id. at 378.
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These propositions track the common law more than they do
statutory law. But the main point is that an interpretation of the
covenant reflecting these relational contract values is not necessarily more intrusive than ordinary tort doctrine.
In tort cases, courts decide whether employer-defendants acted for improper motives or used improper means. The courts
decide the existence of these states of mind by weighing the interests of the plaintiff and the defendant. Depending on whether
ulterior motives necessarily mean bad faith, this may or may not
be a broader inquiry than the good faith inquiry derived from
application of relational contract values.
The fiduciary standard is more demanding than either the
tort or relational contact standards in that a simple showing of
motive other than for the benefit of the plaintiff is enough to establish a breach of the requisite mental state standard.220
B.

Scope of Employer Discretion

The breach issue raises important questions of institutional
responsibility regardless of how the covenant limits employer
power.2 2 ' Potentially, the court and jury are in the position of
making decisions as to what efficient management of the employer's enterprise reasonably requires, balancing legitimate employer needs against legitimate employee interests.222 When the
obligation not to dismiss for certain reasons arises from the implied covenant, the court and jury decide whether the external
standard was met, giving more or less latitude to the term "good
faith."
One important way to limit the implied covenant, even as a
source of good cause obligation, is to instruct the jury explicitly
that employers must retain the discretion to set standards of performance and workplace rules. Only if employers abuse this discretion or use it as a pretext for ulterior motives can they be held
liable. This approach eliminates many cases because presumably
an employee's claim which does not evidence bad faith or pretext
will not be presented before thejury. An alternative formulation,
of course, would permit cases to go to the jury without such spe220 But see supra notes 151-65 and accompanying text (explaining different ways of
interpreting fiduciary duty of loyalty and implied covenant to bring them into closer
accord).
221 These questions also arise under the implied-in-fact contract theory. See H.
PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, §§ 7.24-7.27, at 430-36.
222 See generally id. §§ 7.22-7.28, at 427-39 (a more complete treatment of a breach
and the respective roles of judge and jury).
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cific evidence, simply including the judge's caution to the jury
about what inferences it should draw from dismissal for a reason
that the jury would not find to be just cause.
Another formulation would permit the jury to evaluate de
novo whether the employee in fact did what the employer contended, but not allow it to evaluate the standards set by the employer. Accordingly, if an employer fires an employee for off
duty drug use, the jury would be permitted to decide whether or
not the employee used drugs off duty, but not to decide whether
the rule providing for dismissal for such conduct constitutes
good cause. The foregoing theory is not entirely inconsistent
with the Montana Supreme Court's analysis in Gates II. The Montana courts have suggested, however, that the standard for interpreting the terms "just cause" and "good cause" should be
whether the employer had a fair and honest reason for dismissal.223 The Montana courts have contrasted this standard with an
objective standard.2 24
In Prout v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. ,225 the Montana Supreme
Court, purportedly giving effect to a disclaimer reserving the
right to dismiss at-will, held that dismissal of an at-will employee
for a dishonest reason rather than without cause can violate the
covenant. The court further stated that if an at-will employee is
dismissed for dishonesty, the covenant requires that the employee be given a chance to prove innocence. A somewhat similar approach was used by a California court in Ketchu v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co. 226 The Ketchu court held that a breach of covenant can be established by showing that the employer did not in
good faith and with probable cause believe that there was good
cause for dismissal.
Courts and juries can decide whether cause for dismissal exists by considering the body of labor arbitration precedent, much
of which involves interpretation of express or implied commitments to dismiss only for good cause.227 In determining whether
223 Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 221 Mont. 419, 426-27, 720
P.2d 257, 261-62 (1986).
224 Id.
225 236 Mont. 152, 772 P.2d 288 (1989) (reversing summary judgment for employer and remanding).
226 186 Cal. App. 3d 1644, 231 Cal. Rptr. 581, 586 (1986).
227 See H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, §§ 3.2-3.4, at 121-28. See
also Staton v. Amax Coal Co., 122 Ill. App. 3d 631, 634-35, 461 N.E.2d 612, 615
(1984) (reversing summary judgment for employer, remanding for trial of whether
"cause" for dismissal existed, suggesting standards be borrowed from labor arbitration decisions).
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an employer's discipline of an employee was for cause, an arbitrator usually considers two elements. First, the arbitrator must
make a factual determination as to whether the employee committed the act alleged.2 28 Second, the arbitrator must make a
policy determination as to whether the act committed was of a
character which warranted the discipline imposed.2 2 9
In all types of disputes over the existence of good cause for
dismissal, there are two separate questions: (1) whether the employee engaged in the conduct the employer alleges, and; (2)
whether the conduct constituted just cause for termination of
employment. The first question is a straightforward fact issue.
The second question requires the balancing of employer interests against employee interests, with appropriate consideration
of the public interest on both sides. 230 The same two elements of
cause regularly receive consideration in civil service cases, public
employee constitutional cases, and statutory discrimination
cases. 23 1 There also, courts differentiate between factual questions relating to employee conduct or performance and policy
questions relating to whether such conduct or performance constitutes cause for termination. Substantially more discretion is
given to the employer on the policy question.2 3 2
1.

Who Decides What the Employee Did?

In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,23 3 the seminal impliedin-fact contract case, the Michigan Supreme Court discussed the
facts of the breach issue as follows:
Where the employer claims that the employee was discharged
for specific misconduct-intoxication, dishonesty, insubordination-and the employee claims that he did not commit the
misconduct alleged, the question is one of fact for the jury:
did the employee do what the employer said he did?
Where the employer alleges that the employee was discharged for one reason-excessive tardiness-and the employee presents evidence that he was really discharged for
another reason-because he was making too much money in
See H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, § 3.5, at 128-30.
Id.
See generally id. §§ 7.13-7.35, at 367-456 (discussing justification idea).
See generally id. §§ 2.1-2.38, at 41-117 (statutory claims); §§ 6.1-6.20, at 323-65
(public employee dismissal cases).
232 See id. § 6.13, at 349-351 (substantive due process).
233 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). The Toussaint court discussed the
question in terms of what a jury should decide, but its analytical framework is
equally applicable to a bench trial.
228
229
230
231
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commissions-the question also is one of fact for the jury.
The jury is always permitted to determine the employer's true
reason for discharging the employee.2" 4
In Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp.,235 the Oregon Supreme
Court agreed that the question of breach of a good cause promise
involves the two questions posed earlier in this section. 23 6 The Oregon court concluded, however, that it was for the employer, and not
for the court, to decide the factual question of what conduct occurred. This affirmed a trial court conclusion that "to constitute
'just cause,' the employer... must make a good faith determination
of a sufficient cause for discharge based on facts reasonably believed
23 7
to be true and not for any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason.
The court did not expressly address the issue of who determines
2 38
good cause, but merged the two parts of the good cause inquiry
2.

Who Decides What Is Good Cause?

The Toussaint court had more difficulty with the second question regarding what constitutes good cause. When an employer,
as was the case in Toussaint, has promised to dismiss only for
cause, a court cannot decide the breach issue without, to some
extent, second-guessing the policy question of what amounts to
good cause for termination. If the judicial factfinder is permitted
to decide de novo whether there was good cause for discharge,
there is a danger that the factfinder will substitute its judgment
for the employer's. Thus, "[w]hile the promise to terminate employment only for cause includes the right to have the employer's
decisions reviewed, it does not include a right to be discharged
only with the concurrence of the communal judgment of the
jury. ' 2 39 On the other hand, if the factfinder is prohibited from
finding a breach when the employer's decision to dismiss was not
unreasonable under the circumstances, the promise to dismiss
only for good cause effectively is transformed into a satisfaction
contract. 240 The Toussaint court opted to let the factfinder decide
whether the reason proffered by the employer amounts to good
Id. at 622, 292 N.E.2d at 896 (footnote omitted).
293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982).
236 Id. at 100, 643 P.2d at 1278.
237 Id. at 99, 643 P.2d at 1278.
238 See id.
239 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 622, 292
N.W.2d 880, 896 (1980).
240 Id. at 622-23, 292 N.W.2d at 896.
234

235

732
cause.

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:683

24 1

In Flanigan v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association,2 4 2
the Montana Supreme Court distinguished between dismissal
without good cause, which it rejected as a standard for breach of
the implied covenant, and arbitrary dismissal, which it found
proven from conflicting employer testimony that the employee
was dismissed for poor performance and as part of a layoff without concern for performance.2 4 3
A useful model of the appropriate role for the jury is Video
Electronics, Inc. v. Tedder.2 " Video dealt with a breach of a written
employment contract. The Video court found that (1) the court,
rather than the jury, should construe the contract, and (2) the
jury should decide whether the employer's decision to dismiss
was reasonable, unless the employer had reserved the right in the
contract to be the sole judge as to the grounds for dismissal.2 4 5
In later situations, the jury could decide only whether the employer acted in good faith.
The best approach is for an implied covenant jury to engage
in a limited review of the employer's interpretation of the good
cause standard. To do otherwise would vitiate the employer's
promise, as the Toussaint court observed. 24 6 The jury should not,
however, substitute its judgment for the employer's in defining
good cause. A jury instruction on this question should require
the jury to consider the nexus between the conduct asserted by
the employer as justifying dismissal and the legitimate needs of
the employer's business.2 4 7 Regardless of the jury's role, there
must be evidence to support its verdict.2 48
Id. at 623, 292 N.W.2d at 896.
221 Mont. 419, 720 P.2d 257 (1986).
Id. at 424-25, 720 P.2d at 260.
470 So.2d 4 (Fla. App. 1985).
245 Id. at 6.
246 See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 62223, 292 N.W.2d 880, 896 (1980).
247 See Staton v. Amax Coal Co., 122 Ill. App. 3d 631, 635, 461 N.E.2d 612, 615
(1984). In Staton, the court suggested that cause existed only when: (1) notice has
been given as to the ground for dismissal; (2) similar conduct by different employees is treated similarly; and (3) conduct was detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the employer. Thus, the court reversed summary judgment for the
employer and remanded for trial the issue of whether "cause" for dismissal existed.
The court also noted that the burden of proof is on the employer to show cause.
This is the same approach followed in public employee dismissal cases in which
civil service statutes or regulations require cause as a prerequisite to dismissal. See
H. PERRrrT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, §§ 6.2-6.5, at 324-33.
248 See Ferraro v. Koelsch, 119 Wis. 2d 407, 350 N.W.2d 735 (Wis. Ct. App.
1984), aff'don other grounds, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985) (no evidence
241
242
243
244
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Proving a Breach: Burdens of Proof

The burden of proof, on the issue of the existence of cause
for termination, can be placed on either the plaintiff-employee or
the defendant-employer. The plaintiff is burdened to plead and
prove the absence of cause if the question is viewed as an essential part of establishing a breach of the legally implied employer
promise of employment security. 2 49 The defendant, on the other
hand, is burdened to plead and prove cause for dismissal if the
question is viewed as one of establishing a condition subsequent
that excuses the defendant's obligation to perform the promise
of continued employment. 250 Treating existence of cause as a
condition subsequent is probably more appropriate for promises
of life employment or for a definite term than for promises to
employ until cause for dismissal exists.
The resolution of this burden of proof question is frequently
outcome-determinative. It is not beyond the realm of possibility,
for example, that neither the plaintiff, nor the defendant-employer will have evidence on the reason for the plaintiff's discharge, if the employer assumed at the time that no cause was
legally necessary to justify termination of what it viewed as an
employment-at-will. Such a case might go to the factfinder with
no evidence on the cause question. The party on whom the burden of production is imposed would therefore lose as a matter of
law.
Precedent from arbitration hearings imposes the burden on
the employer to prove cause for discharge. 25 1 Evidence law commentators suggest that the placement of burdens of proof should
turn on several factors, such as the "policy of handicapping disfavored contentions,"' 252 imposing the burden on the party with the
to support jury verdict for employee; all evidence showed that employee violated
rules explicitly which set forth in handbook as grounds for dismissal, and that employer met its obligation to investigate).
249 See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 337, at 785 (E.
Cleary 2d ed. 1972). See also Wyman v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, Inc., 493 A.2d

330, 335 (Me. 1985) (affirming judgment for employer based on employee's failure
to sustain burden of proof that dismissal was without just cause).
250 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 comment e (1981).

Com-

ment e explains that the term "condition subsequent" is not used in the Restatement
(Second). Rather, the concept is treated in section 230 under the heading, "Event
that Terminates a Duty."

251 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 621 (3d ed. 1973).
252 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 249, § 337, at 786-87. The policy probably

accounts for the requirement that the defendant bears the burden with respect to
matters such as contributory negligence, the statute of limitations, and truth in defamation cases.
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best access to relevant knowledge, 253 and imposing the burden in
accordance with "judicial estimate of the probabilities of the situation. ' 2 54 The first and third of these factors militate in favor of
imposing the burden of proving the absence of cause for dismissal on the plaintiff.
Several cases offer guidance as to the burdens of proof imposed on plaintiff and defendant concerning good cause for termination. In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. ,255 the California Court of
Appeal, concluding that there were facts from which a jury could
determine the existence of an implied promise of continued employment, 256 gave guidance on burdens of proof which the trial
court might confront on remand. The court noted that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that the termination was
wrong. 25 7 The court then cited a Title VII case 258 in support of
allocating the order of proof. After the plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case of wrongful termination in violation of
the employment contract, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to show the reason for the termination. 259 Next, the
plaintiff might attack the defendant's proffered explanation,
either on the grounds that it is a pretext or on the grounds that it
is insufficient to meet the employer's obligation under the contract or applicable legal principles. The court cautioned, however, that the legitimate exercise of managerial discretion not be
infringed upon and that "good cause in the context of Mr. Pugh's
case is 'quite different from the standard applicable in determining the propriety of an employee's termination under a contract
for a specified term.' ",260 The court then characterized the appropriate standard of cause as "a fair and honest cause or reason,
253 Id. at 787. Usually, the defendant must bear the burden of proof of payment
of discharge in bankruptcy and in license cases. But very often a party is required
to plead and prove matters peculiarly within the opponent's knowledge.
254 Id. The risk of failure of proof may be placed on the party who contends the
more unusual event occurred. For instance, where a gift is alleged in a business
relationship, the burden of proving donative intent is placed on the party claiming
the gift.
255 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
256 Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927 (there were facts in evidence from which the
jury could determine the existence of such an implied promise: the duration of
employment; commendations and promotions received; the apparent lack of any
direct criticism of work; the assurances given; and the employer's acknowledged
policies).
257 Id. at 329-30, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
258 Id. at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
259 Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
260 Id. at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 928. The court added that where, as here, the
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regulated by good faith on the part of the [employer]." 26 '
In Kravetz v. Merchants Distributors, Inc. ,262 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court reversed a judgment entered on a jury
verdict for the plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal suit. The trial
judge instructed the jury that the defendant-employer had the
burden of proving that the plaintiff-employee did not perform
satisfactorily. This was prejudicial error, the appellate court concluded, because "[t]he jury may well have concluded, incorrectly,
that [the employer] had the burden of proving that it had good
cause to discharge [Kravetz]. 263 The supreme court, however,
reversed stating that the employer was entitled to a clear instruction that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant terminated the employment without cause.264
This burden on the plaintiff to prove the absence of cause
26 5
may not be as onerous as it seems. In an early Vermont case,
the Vermont Supreme Court held that the plaintiff has the burden of proving "his faithful performance of that contract and his
' 2 66
wrongful discharge from the engagement by the defendant.

The court went on, however: "Had the plaintiff satisfied the jury
of his adequate fulfillment of his undertaking, in the absence of
anything to the contrary, the jury might infer that there was no
sufficient cause for the defendant to discharge him. '2 67 This observation raises the possibility that a wrongfully discharged plaintiff could satisfy his burden by showing good job performance.
For example, the plaintiff could introduce evidence of satisfactory performance appraisals. This showing would not only overcome the plaintiff's burden, but would effectively shift the
burden of production to the defendant to articulate the cause for
the discharge. The court held, however, that it was an error for
the trial court to establish a presumption in the plaintiff's favor.
employee occupied a sensitive managerial and confidential position, the employer
must be allowed substantial scope in the exercise of subjective judgment.
261 Id. See Capone v. Cheesbrough Ponds, Inc., 112 A.D.2d 779, 492 N.Y.S.2d
277 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (absence for 31% of available working time is good
cause for dismissal), app. dismissed, 67 N.Y.2d 904, 492 N.E.2d 1230, 501 N.Y.S.2d
814, (1986).
262 387 Mass. 457, 440 N.E.2d 1278 (1982).
263 Id. at 462, 440 N.E.2d at 1281.
264 Id. at 462-63, 440 N.E.2d at 1281.
265 Lambert v. Equinox House, Inc., 126 Vt. 229, 227 A.2d 403 (1967) (reversing
wrongful discharge judgment for plaintiff).
266 Id. at 231, 227 A.2d at 404.
267 Id. See Washington Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 613, 616 (D.C.
1985) (jury could infer lack of good cause for dismissal on conflicting evidence
regarding whether plaintiff was disruptive).
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Therefore, the court reversed because of the following jury

instruction:
The burden of proving just cause of the discharge of the employee generally rests upon the employer, and where the employee enters upon his duties and continues until he is
dismissed, he need not prove that he performed his duties as a
presumption arises that such is the fact, and the burden of
proving a sufficient cause of his discharge is on the employer,
and this burden does not shift to the employee by reason of
the allegations in his complaint that he was dismissed without
268
good cause.
V.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Although in the abstract, it seems that a good cause interpretation of the covenant is dramatically different from a more deferential interpretation, the jury instructions explored herein
show that the difference may be more apparent than real. The
prevailing view of the good cause standard suggests that
factfinders should defer substantially to employer determinations
on the facts of employee performance and conduct and on the
policy decision as to what should constitute good cause for eliminating a particular employment relationship.
In an implied covenant case, 26 9 one of two types 27° of jury
instructions can be given on the breach issue, a good cause instruction, and a specific mental state instruction.2 v'
268 Lambert, 126 Vt. at 231, 227 A.2d at 404. See also Schmidly v. Pery Motor
Freight, Inc., 735 F.2d 1086, 1087 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirming, as consistent with
Arkansas law, jury instruction burdening plaintiff to prove absence of wilful misconduct or employer's lack of good faith in believing that employee conduct detrimental to employer).
269 A variety of jury instructions can be found in M. DICHTER, A. GROSS, D.
MORIKAWA,

& S. SAUNTRY, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW:

FORMS AND PROCEDURES

§§ 8.47-8.69 (1986) [hereinafter M. DICHTER].
270 A third type limits the covenant to public policy jeopardy. A public policy
type is illustrated by the portion of the Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121
N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981) instruction quoted in H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DisMISSAL, supra note 5, § 7.16, at 408. Ajury instruction defining good faith in terms
of public policy was reviewed sympathetically in Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc.,
193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984), where the Supreme Court of Connecticut
held that an employee, hired under a contract of indefinite duration, could not
maintain a cause of action in contract for breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing based wholly upon a discharge without just cause. Id. at 559,
479 A.2d at 782.
271 It would be simpler to call this a "malice" instruction, but the term "malice"
has so much baggage from defamation law and elsewhere that it may confuse the
issue to use that term.
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Good Cause Instruction, with Three Variations

The first type, a good cause instruction, permits a verdict for
the plaintiff-employee if the jury concludes that the dismissal was
not supported by good cause. There are three subtypes of good
cause instruction: the first leaving the jury a free hand; the second leaving the employer a relatively free hand to determine
what is good cause and to decide the facts constituting such
cause, and; the third intermediate instruction between those two
extremes. In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. ,272 the court approved submitting the question of motive to the jury in simple
terms: "Did the Defendant act in bad faith.., when it decided to
terminate the Plaintiff's contract . . .?,27" The court permitted
the jury to infer bad faith-an intent to deprive the plaintiff of
legitimately earned commissions-from the termination of the
plaintiff one day after a large order was obtained on which commissions would have been due. 7 4 Similarly, in Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co. ,275 the court gave the jury a fairly free hand in finding
bad faith or malice from the circumstances. 2 76 The dissent disagreed that such an inference rationally could be drawn from the
evidence.2 77 The Montana Supreme Court in Prout v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 278 approved a jury instruction that encourages a jury
to apply a good cause standard with little principled guidance.
The instruction presented in Pine River State Bank v. Met373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
Id. at 100, 364 N.E.2d at 1255.
Id. at 103, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (fact that dismissal was after portion of bonus
vested still created question for jury on defendant's motive in terminating employment). But see Tenedios v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 20 Mass. App. Ct. 252, 254, 479
N.E.2d 723, 726 (1985) (arbitrary firing for suspicion of theft from employer does
not breach covenant under Fortune doctrine).
275 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
276 Id. at 133-34, 316 A.2d at 552 (holding that foreman's overtures and capricious firing, the seeming manipulation ofjob assignments, and the apparent connivance of the personnel manager in this course of events collectively support the
jury's conclusion that the dismissal was maliciously motivated). See also Gray v. Superior Court (Cipher Data), 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1986) (employee offered insufficient evidence to show violation of public policy in state
discrimination statute by showing employee was not insubordinate and handbook
procedures not followed, but had stated claim for breach of implied covenant because these claims were based on questions of fact, not law).
277 Monge, 114 N.H. at 134-35, 316 A.2d at 552. The dissent argued that a reasonable person could not find for the plaintiff on the evidence of the case, that the
substance of the plaintiff's claim is that she was dismissed because she did not accept an invitation by her foreman to go out with him, and that it is not reasonable to
find that this single refusal was the reason for the termination of plaintiff's
employment.
278 236 Mont. 152, 772 P.2d 288 (1989).
272
273
274
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tile2 7 9 is a good example of the second subtype of good cause
instruction. This instruction yields more latitude to the
employer:
It is the law that ...

an employer has the right to establish its

own standards of performance, and if the defendant [employee] was not performing his work according to those standards, the bank would have good or just cause to terminate
him for non-performance. And this is true even though some
other employer might not have had as high standards, and it's
true even though you, the jury, might feel that the bank's standards were too high. In order to breach standards of performance, an employee must know what the standards are, and in
order to terminate for good cause, an employee must not only
have breached the standards of performance, but the employer must have uniformly applied its standards of performance to all employees. If you find that the [employee] has
sustained his burden of proof and has proven that the bank
terminated him without good or just cause under the circumstances shown by the evidence, and the law I have just given
you, [then your verdict should be for the employee]. 2 80
In Osterkamp v. Alkota Manufacturing Co.,28 1 the court approved
the following instruction in a case where the breach allegation was
premised on the employer's failure to follow the procedures in a
personnel handbook:
The reason for Plaintiff's discharge is not material to the resolution of the issue in this case. The only issue to be resolved
by you is whether or not Plaintiff's discharge from his employment was in violation of Defendant's own rules and regulations, and if so, whether or not Plaintiff sustained any damages
thereby. 8 2
These instructions reserve to the employer virtually unlimited
latitude to define good cause. An intermediate allocation of decision-making responsibility, a third subtype of good cause instruction, 283 requires that the cause asserted by the employer bear a
reasonable relationship to the employer's business needs. Thus, the
279

333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). The appellate court found the just cause in-

struction to be in error because the employer was found not to have promised to
terminate only for cause. Nevertheless, the instruction is a good example of an
instruction where the existence of cause appropriately is at issue.
280 Id. at 622. The court affirmed the instruction given by the trial court. The
instruction was not quoted by the court in the appellate division's opinion.

332 N.W.2d 275, 277 (S.D. 1983).
Id.
283 The third subtype of just cause instruction is hard to distinguish from the
specific mental state instructions discussed infra in this section.
281

282
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instruction quoted above can be supplemented by the following
language:
You may not find that the employer had cause to discharge the
plaintiff unless you find that the reason given by the employer
for the dismissal related to the employer's business. If you
find that the reason given related only to the employee's offthe-job activities, and that the employer has no legitimate interest in those activities, then you may not find that cause
existed.2 8 4
This intermediate approach was followed in Roach v. Consolidated
Forwarding Co. ,285 in which the court affirmed the following jury instruction on the meaning of good cause:
As used in these instructions, the term "just cause" means a
real cause or basis for dismissal as distinguished from an arbitrary whim or caprice-that is, a cause or ground that a reasonable employer, acting in good faith under the collective
bargaining agreement here in question, would regard as good
and sufficient reason for terminating the services of an
employee. 8 6
On remand, the trial court in Pugh gave an intermediate type of
good cause instruction:
Appellant's second theory is that See's breached the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing implied by law in any employment contract. Under this theory, appellant has the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts
necessary to prove the following issues: (1) the existence of an
implied contract of employment; (2) that the circumstances of
appellant's termination by See's revealed bad faith and were
contrary to the duty of good faith and fair dealing; and (3)
damages legally caused by that bad faith termination. The
question of what is or is not good faith and fair dealing between an employer and an employee, or what constitutes good
cause for termination is for you to decide under all the circumstances of this case, and in light of the evidence that has been
presented. You are not to decide whether or not in your opinion the appellant's work performance was or was not satisfactory. It is not appropriate for you to substitute your opinion
for that of the company management in evaluating appellant's
work performance. You shall examine the reasons given by
the employer as to why the appellant was terminated for unsat284

See H.

PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL,

supra note 5, § 7.28, at 438.

285 665 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. App. 1984) (suit for breach of fair representation by

union, and breach of collective bargaining agreement by employer).
286 Id. at 679 n.2.
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isfactory work performance, and to determine whether or not
the employer acted in good faith and not arbitrarily. The
phrase "good faith" of the employer describes the state of
mind of the employer which is honest of purpose, free from an
intention to defraud, and in keeping with one's duty of reasonability. The phrase "bad faith" is the opposite of "good faith"
and describes a state of mind of the employer which is fraudulent or designed to mislead or deceive, or one in which the
neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or contractual obligation
is not the result of an honest mistake, but arises out of a sinister or evil motive.2 8 7
In Wadeson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. ,288 the court
approved a jury instruction on good faith, rejecting the plaintiff's
argument that the covenant required the employer to discharge only
for good cause.28 9 It impliedly approved the following jury
instruction:
North Dakota law recognizes an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in all contracts. In employment contracts, this means that neither party may do anything in bad
faith that will injure the rights of the other to receive the benefits of the employment agreement. In order for Wayne
Wadeson to prevail on this count, the preponderance of the
evidence must show that he was dealt with unfairly and in bad
faith in the termination of his employment contract. Factors
which you may consider in determining whether Defendants
breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing to Wayne
Wadeson are duration of employment, commendations and
promotions or lack thereof, employee evaluations, job performance, existing personnel policies, and any assurances or
representations by the defendants that shows an implied
promise by the employer not to act arbitrarily or unfairly in
terminating his employment contract. The law, however, does not
forbid a terminationfor legal cause related to the employer's legitimate
interest in running the business.2 90
The Montana Supreme Court suggested the following instruction on breach of the covenant:
In determining whether the defendant violated the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, you must balance the interests of
287 Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 743, 755, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195,
206-07 (1988) (quoting and approving jury instructions).

288 343 N.W.2d 367 (N.D. 1984).

Id. at 370.
Id. at 369 (emphasis added). See also Ketchu v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 186 Cal.
App. 3d 1644, 231 Cal. Rptr. 581, 586 (1986) (quoting employer's proffered jury
instruction on covenant and reversing trial court for failing to give it).
289
290
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the defendant in controlling its work force with the interest of
the plaintiff in job security. An employer such as Pacific is entitled to be motivated by and to serve its own legitimate business interests, and must be given discretion in determining
who it will employ and retain in employment. Thus if the employer is motivated to discharge the employee for reasons unfair or not honest, the employee is entitled to recover damages
proximately caused by the breach. On the other hand, if the
employer was motivated by honest business reasons in discharging the employee, the employer had the right to terminate the employment on the same day as notice is given for the
discharge. 2 9 '
The third subtype of implied covenant instruction would permit
the jury to find a breach if it finds that the employee was dismissed
for off-duty conduct bearing no relation to legitimate employer
interests.2 9 2
B.

Subjective Good Faith Instruction

The second type of implied covenant instruction, a subjective good faith instruction, is fundamentally different in concept
from a good cause instruction, though similar in reality to the
third subtype of good cause instruction, as a comparison with the
Pugh instruction demonstrates. This second basic type of instruction permits a verdict for the plaintiff-employee only if the jury
finds a specific mental state. This approach is illustrated by the
Cloutier instructions:
Was the termination of the employment, the contract of employment at will, by the employer, A & P, motivated by bad
faith or malice or based on retaliation? Now, I have just used a
term of art, and that word "malice" may bother some. So I am
going to define that for you as meaning actual malice or ill will,
hatred, hostility, or some evil motive on the part of the defendant ....

29

Depending on the role of the judge and jury in deciding de novo
what constitutes good cause, there may not be much difference between a good cause standard and a subjective good faith standard.
As the quoted instructions illustrate, one view of the jury's role in
291 Hobbs v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 236 Mont. 503, 508, 771 P.2d 125, 129-30
(1989) (reversing judgment on jury verdict for employer because of error in implied covenant instruction, which failed to emphasize that standard is legitimate
expectations of parties). Earlier parts of the suggested instruction on determining
whether the covenant should be applied are omitted.
292 See M. DICHTER, supra note 269 § 8.62, at 338 (citing Rulon Miller).
293 Id.
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enforcing a good cause standard is to determine whether the employer decided in good faith that particular circumstances and factual inferences constituted good cause. It is difficult to distinguish
this kind ofjury question from presenting the jury with the question
of whether the employer acted in good faith. The degree of jury
intrusion into employer management of the workplace depends not
on whether one adopts a good cause or subjective good faith approach, but on the degree to which one instructs the jury to defer to
employer rules of conduct and performance.
VI.

DAMAGES

Compensation in the form of money damages for disappointed expectations is the usual remedy for breach of contract.
Expectation damages are measured by the financial position the
plaintiff would have occupied had the contract been fully performed. Expectation damages in a wrongful dismissal case require the factfinder to project how long the employee would have
been employed but for the employer's breach. Damages for the
period of time after the trial are referred to as front pay. Quantifying front pay is an inherently speculative undertaking.2 9 4 Some
courts deny front pay.29 5 There is a trend, however, in implied
contract cases, like statutory employment discrimination cases, to
award front pay. 29 6 Stark v. Circle K. Corp. 297 is a recent example
where the court affirmed a $230,000 jury verdict for an employee
dismissed for refusing to sign a contested probation notice.
Foley has been controversial because the plaintiff bar had
hoped that the implied covenant theory would prove to be a
broad means of challenging the propriety of dismissals while also
generating sufficient damages in meritorious cases to compen294 Compare Washington Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 613, 617 (D.C.
1985) ($26,000 jury award for future earnings under contract terminable only for
just cause allowed to stand) with Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 391 Mass. 333, 334,
461 N.E.2d 796, 798 (1984) (reversing $325,000 judgment for dismissed employee
on grounds that proper measure is not same as earnings for lifetime employment).
295 See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 251, 743 S.W.2d 380,

386 (1988) (reviewing cases rejecting front pay as too speculative). In Brockmeyer
v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), the court concluded

that reinstatement and backpay were the most appropriate remedies for wrongful
dismissal in violation of a public policy. Id. at 575, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
296 See, e.g., Ritchie v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 163 Mich. App. 358, 372-74,

413 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1987) (approving front pay in implied contract case); H.
PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 5, § 4.28, at 236-41.
297 230 Mont. 468, 476, 751 P.2d 162, 167 (1988) (an employer must proffer a
"fair and honest reason" for termination in order to escape liability under the
covenant).
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sate the plaintiff bar.298 The California Supreme Court disappointed these plaintiff lawyers. The Foley court was not wrong;
the implied covenant is a contract theory. All the covenant does
is to impose a term of the employment contract that the parties
themselves did not establish.
It is true, of course, that something like the covenant has
been associated with tort damages in insurance law. In order to
make the case for a broader range of damages in connection with
wrongful termination from employment, one must begin with the
different purposes of contract enforcement and tort law in the
legal system. Generally, people think of contract law as protecting expectations, while tort law is associated with protecting the
public interest. This, of course, justifies awarding larger damages in public policy tort cases than in implied contract or implied covenant cases where the only interest involved is that of
the individual employee.
There are two ways to get what the plaintiff bar wants. One
way is to elevate the interests of the individual employee to
broader societal interests, thereby justifying tort damages for
breach of employment contracts. A more feasible way is to recognize that front pay should be the usual remedy in breach of
contract cases. Absent proof that an employee's tenure was likely
to be cut short, the employee's benefit of the bargain is continuation of employment, and damages for breach of the bargain are
the wages and benefits the employee would have received while
the employment continued.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of comprehensive statutory reform, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will most likely be
used to expand the substantive rights afforded at-will employees.
The implied covenant recognizes the relational character of employment contracts, something already well recognized through
trends in statutory law and in the collective bargaining relationship. The covenant is broad enough conceptually to require
cause for dismissal of long-term employees. Interpreting the
covenant to require cause for termination is really a small doctri298 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1988) (only contract damages recoverable for breach of implied covenant;
public policy tort must be based on rights and obligations affecting the public
rather than on internal employer operations; statute of frauds no bar to implied-infact contract enforcement).
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nal step beyond what is already done for nonemployment contracts. Imposition of a simple good cause standard actually may
reduce transaction costs of a termination decision compared with
the status quo, because employers face such a diverse array of
fragmentary duties to employees. It may be appropriate under
this interpretation to apply the covenant only to long-term employees, for example those with service in excess of five years. If
the covenant is interpreted to require good cause, courts should
instruct juries to defer to employer determinations of performance and conduct standards, unless they are arbitrary or
irrational.
Articulating a test of arbitrariness for employer rules also invites interpreting the covenant to legitimate a kind of review of
employer dismissal decisions analogous to judicial review of administrative agency decisions. Either a good cause approach or
an administrative law model protects legitimate employee expectations, while limiting the danger of ignoring legitimate employer
expectations and the risk of unacceptable increases in employment costs.

